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PREFACE 
During the summer of 1963, under the direction of Dr. Stanley J. 
Folmsbee, Professor of History at The University of Tennessee, I pre­
pared a short paper on an early period of Cordell Hull's congressional 
career. This study was fascinating. It appeared to me that many stu­
dents who know a great deal about Hull's secretaryship under President 
Roosevelt are unaware of his preparation for this high position. Thus, 
during the latter part of the summer after a trip to Hull's hometown, 
Carthage, Tennessee, it was concluded that a thesis on the congressional 
career of Cordell Hull would prove a valuable contribution to historic$! 
research. 
Of �nvaluable help in this project was the staff of The University 
of Tennessee Library. Miss Eleanor Goehring, research librarian at The 
University of Tennessee, deserves special appreciation. Also of assist­
ance was the staff of Knoxville's Lawson McGhee Library. 
I am also deeply indebted to those of the Department of History,, 
University of Tennessee, who served so ably as members of the committee 
responsible for the reviewing of this thesis. Of great assistance were 
Dr. LeRoy P. Graf and Dr. Ralph W. Haskins. A special word of grati­
tude is given Dr. Folmsbee, head of the committee. And above all, my 
faithful mother is thanked for her splendid help in typing. 
ii 
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BACKGROUND, STATE POLITICS, ELECTION TO THE HOUSE 
Cordell Hull, the middle child in a family of five sons, was born 
in a rented log cabin on October 2, 1871, in Overton (now Pickett) 
County, Tennessee, a distance of seventy-five miles from the nearest 
railroad. A mile away was the only store in the entire area, and it 
also housed the post office called Olympus. The section in which he 
was born w�s known as the foothills of the Cumberland Plateau. During 
t ' 
the Civil War it was considered a border  area, and its inhabitants con­
sisted largely of pe ople with divided loyalties between the North and 
the South. Hull's father chose to fight on the side of the Confederacy.1 
As to the type of people who surrounded Hull during his e arly years-­
they were a common group possessed with that quality of the frontier 
"Jacksonian spirit" that was to characterize many of our nation's 
leaders of Hull's time. They were unalterably convinced that in a 
democratic nation an individual, by hard work and discipline, could rise 
far above his lowly surroundings of birth. Hull typified the "Jacksonian 
spirit"--.the rise of the conunon man. 
Cordell Hull's early schooling was received at various free 
schools which he attended, as his father moved frequently within the 
1cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York: 
The Macmillian Company-:--1'948), I, t:'6. 
1 
2 
mountain section establishing new farms. It was while going to school 
at Willow Grove, a distance of two miles from the family farmhouse, 
that the father made a decision which had lasting effect on the son's 
life. During a school debate which attracted most of the community, the 
fourteen-year-old Hull delighted his father.so much by his presentation 
that the proud father readily decided that his middle son should receive 
the best educ�tion possible. 
The debate resulted in Hull's being sent to Montvale·lnstitute·in 
Celina, the county seat of Clay County. The principal of the schQol was 
Professor Joe S. McMillin, the brother of Congressman Benton McMillin of 
Tennessee. There, during the first months of 1886, Hull studied algebra, 
geometry, trigonometry, surveying, English, rhetoric, Latin, Greek, and 
German. He soon found that he was much more interested by "mathematics, 
history, and literature than by languages and· sciences." Before the 
age of twelve, Hull had found that he "could answer any question in.the 
United States history textbook" and even the footnotes. During the 
same year, 1886, he went to the "normal school at Bowling Green, Kentucky," 
2 
which he attended for two five-months terms. 
The first large city that Hull ever saw was Nashville, Tennessee, 
when at the age of sixteen he floated down the Cumberland River on a 
raft. I n  his book, The Memoirs �.Cordell Hull, he records his vivid 
impressions: 
2 I bid. , 14-18. 
3 
It was a sight to be treasured, one·r shall always recall. The 
buildings were more magnificent and the people more numerous than 
I could have imagined. Nashville was the metropolis of middle 
Tennessee, most of which was a bluegrass section. It was a large 
hardwood market as well as a market for livestock and farm com­
modities generally. It was then, as now, a noted educational city, 
sometimes called the Athens of the South. The·city was calculated 
to impress, not to say overawe, the average young backwoodsman like 
myself who first·visited it.3 
There, in Nashville, Hull bought his first law books, paying for them 
from the wages received from working on the raft. 
Before Hull was quite seventeen years old, he made his first po­
litical speech. It was during the presidential campaign of 1888 between 
Cleveland and Harrison, with the major issue being the tariff question. 
Hull supported Cleveland's platform for a lower tariff, and thus formu­
lated ideas which would endure the remainder of his life and affect 
people in all corners of the world. That fall Hull traveled to Lebanon, 
Ohio, and enrolled in the National Normal University, the parent school 
of the normal school he attended at Bowling Green, Kentucky. There he 
scored 90, 95, and 100 in debating, 95 in elocution,. 100 in rhetoric, 
and 60 to 75 in other subjects.4 
In 1890 Hull began to study law· in Nashville in.the office of 
Pitts and Meeks. During the summer of the same year, he was selected 
for an office which he later declared "thrilled me more than any other 
since that time." He was elected chairman-of the Democratic County 
3rbid., 19-21. 
4liarold B. Hinton, Cordell_Hull, ! Biography (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc. , 1942), 46. 
4 
Committee for Clay County.5 Although only nineteen,.the same summe� he 
was chosen as a delegate to the Democratic State Convention. He·partici­
pated in the convention even though.he was not able to vote·in elections.6 
That fall Hull read law in the office of Congressman·Benton McMillin's 
brother, John H. McMillin, in Celina. When the Congressman arrived to 
campaign for his reelection, he found the ambitious young man more than 
willing to offer his assistance. Driving a horse and buggy, Hull toQk 
Congressman McMillin across the rugged Cumberland Plateau and Highland 
Rim areas of his mountainous district. From this experience, especially 
through talking with Congressman McMillin, Hull gained a considerable 
amount of practical political knowledge. 
In  January, 1891, Hull began.his formal. law education by enter­
ing Cumberland Law School at Lebanon, Tennessee. After successfully 
passing a rigid entrance examination, he was promptly permitted to enter 
the senior-class. I n  June of the same year, he passed the final examina­
tions, was graduated, and was sworn in as a memper of the bar.7 
While practicing law during the summer of 1892, several weeks 
before his twenty-first birthday, Hull campaigned to represent his 
traditionally Democratic·county in the state legislature.8 To the sur�\ 
5Hull, op. cit., I ,  2 1-26. 
6Nashville Tennesseean, July 24, 1955. 
7Hull, op. cit., I, 26-�7. 
8Nashville_Tennesseean, July 24, 1955. 
5 
prise of many, he soqndly defeated his Democratic opponent in the 
primary election, and upon tuF.ni-n.g·- t:�nty-one a month before the regular 
November election, he won an easy victory over the Republican candidate. 
Hull was reelected in 1894 without opposition, and became chair­
man of the Joint Legislative Committee. He immediately found himself 
confronted with the election contest "then pending between Governor 
Pete·r Turney and H. Clay Evans, the Republican candidate ... 9 Evans had 
10 received 105,104 votes, and Turney 104,356. At that time the state 
constitution and a state law required the payment of a poll tax by 
voters, and Turney's supporters contended that many of those who voted 
for Evans had not paid the tax, or that the Republican Party had paid 
the tax for them. The legislature passed a resolution introduced by 
Hull authorizing an investigation by a legislative committee. That 
committee, also headed by Hull, decided to divide into subcommittees 
and canvass the areas where those-election irregularities had been-re­
ported. 
Hull tdeliberately chose East Tennessee, the Republican strong­
hold where most of the questionable·ballots lay. In counties such �s 
Hawkins and Sevier, Hull and his group were warned not to enter for their 
lives would be endangered. Nevertheless, they went into all the East 
Tennessee counties, and while they were in Sevier County, shots were 
9Hull, £.2· _cit. , I, 27-31. 
lOHinton, op. cit., 46. 
6 
·fired at the hotel in which they were staying. After ttie committee had 
made a meticulous investigation of the entire state, Hull presented the 
majority report in the House, and after a heated debate, the Senate 
concurred.11  The state legislature declared that 94, 794 "legal" votes 
had been cast for the Democrat, Governor Turney, and 92, 440 for Evans. 12 
It should be mentioned that Eugene Lewis in his article describing 
the election presents a more balanced point of view than either Hull or 
his biographer, Harold B. Hinton. In addition to setting·out the points 
of evidence described by those writers, Lewis states that a minority 
report was submitted and rejected which declared that "Turney's charges 
of fraud rested alone upon alleged violation of poll tax law in the 
non-production of statutory evidence." According to the·report,.the 
"alleged violationf · was-· only technical and should not have affected the 
qualifications of the voter.13 Besides presenting numerous counter 
charges for the Republican side, the minority report asse�ted that the 
"election was as fair as any held in Tennessee for many yearsi.1114 
llHun·, �· cit., I, 31-33. 
12Hinton, £.e· cit., 49-50. 
13J. Eugene Lewis, "The Tennessee Gubernatorial Campaign and 
Election of 1894, " Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XIII (March, 1954), 
321. 
14Tennessee Senate Journal, 1895, (April 30, 1895), 5 22. 
7 
In 1898 Hull's law career was interrupted by the Spanish-Amertcan 
war. Hull quickly raised a group of volunteers known as Company H of 
the Fourth Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Infantry. This company was 
composed mostly of men from Clay and adjacent counties.15 The Fou�th 
Tennessee mobilized in Knoxville, and on November 28, 1898, Captain 
Hull's men left for Savannah, Georgia, to sail for Cuba, too late, ·how-
.ever, to participate in the hostilities, as an armistice had been 
arranged and peace negotiations were being held in Paris between the two 
countries. The regiment landed in the province of Santa Clara and re-
.mained there on garrison duty for five months. The result was that there 
was ample time for leisurely-recreational activities such as card play­
ing. There Hull became most proficient at playing poker, and returned 
home in May, 1899, with the reputation of being the best poker play in 
the entire Army.16 
After reestablishing himself in Celina, Hull decided in 1901 to 
broaden his law practice. He moved to Gainesboro, Jackson County, and 
entered into partnership with John Gore, a prominent local Republican 
who later became state senator and judge of the United States District 
Court of Middle Tennessee.17 Much of the success of the partnership was 
15Hull, �· cit., I, 33-34. 
16r bid�'' 36� • .. · .. ' 11 
171 bid. , 37-38. 
8 
attributable to the fact that the two were able to form a workable team 
even though each partner strongly maintained and asserted his political 
party identity.18 
The law partnership was of short duration due to the resignation 
of the presiding judge of the Fifth·Judicial Circuit, W. T •. Smith. Judge 
Smith� a close friend of Hull, had expressed his desire to Governor 
James B. Frasier that Hull succeed him. Hull, although.desiring not �o 
relinquish.his private law practice, reluctantly accepted the appointment. 
The judicial circuit encompassed ten counties in the Cumberlands, and 
Hull traveled by horse and buggy over the mountainqus roads. The schedule 
was arranged so that judge would hold court once every four months in each 
county, and Hull found that a week's stay in each of the ·countie$ was of 
sufficient duration. Having filled the unexpired term of Judge Smith, 
Hull was elected unanimously in the election of 1904. During his judge­
ship experience .he was to come in-close contact with those people who 
were most responsible for supporting and electing him to Congress in 
future years. 19 
In 1906 many political friends and Democrats loyal to no specific 
faction in the Fourth Congressional District20 urged Hull to make the race 
1¾inton, �· cit., 74. 19Hull, £f · cit., I, 38-42 . 
20Tennessee's Fourth Congressional District included the follow­
ing counties: Jackson, Macon, Putnam, Pickett, Rhea, Smith, Sumner, 
Trousdale, Wilson, Clay, Overton, Cumberland, Fentress, and Morgan. 
Official Congressional Directory��-�££ �_United States�­
gress, 60 Cong., 1 sess., 120. Hereafter cited Official Congressional 
Directory. 
for Congress. Seven years earlier the seat had been held for some 
9 
twenty years by Hull's friend, Benton McMillin, who had been elected 
governor in 1898. Hull's opponents in the primary election were incumbent 
Congressman M. G. Butler and James T. Miller. The young politician Hull 
traveled extensively throughout the fourteen counties of the district, 
making speeches and seeking voters' support. In the primary election 
he won by only fifteen votes.2 1  In the November election Hull received 
11,961 votes and soundly defeated J. E. Oliver, the Republican candidate, 
who received 10,312·votes.22  
More than a year passed before the Congress to which Hull was 
elected convened. During.the interval before going to Congress, he 
established his residence in Carthage,. Tennessee, and then· journeyed to 
Washington and secured the assistance of agricultural and public high­
way officials who visited each·of the fourteen counties of his district. 
The meetings were largely attended by farmers and were helpful in creat-­
ing an interest within the area as to the need for improvement in agri­
culture methods and the development of highways. Hull also traveled to 
Nashville and attended a meeting of those concerned with-the improvement 
of the navigation of the Cumberland River. I n  1907, still before attend­
ing his first session of Congress, Hull took a boat trip from St. Louis 
2 1Hull, £E· cit., I, 42�43. Hull received 6,298 votes, Miller 
6,283, and Butler 3,103. I bid., 43. 
22afficial Congressional Directory, 60 Cong., 1 sess., 120. 
10 
down the Mississippi River to New · Orleans with President Theodore 
Roosevelt and several members of Congress. The purpose of the trip, 
as sponsored and promoted by the Mississippi Valley organization, was 
for the President and those members of Congress representing that area 
to gain firsthand information about the Mississippi and its tributaries.
23 
The Sixtieth Congress, to which Hull was elected, convened on 
December 2, 1907.
24 
Both houses of Congress were predominantly Republican, 
and the White House was occupied by the dynamic Theodore Roosevelt. At 
this time a panic, the so-called Banker's Panic, was raging, with eight 
thousand banks closed. 25 As usual, the first order·of business of the 
House was the election of a speaker. The Republican, Joseph G. Cannon 
of I llinois, known better as "Uncle Joe, " largely due to his ironclad 
1 d h. . . 26 control of the House, was ree ecte to t is position. Soon Hull, as 
anticipated, was to find that he had been placed by Speaker Cannon on two 
relatively obscure committees--Reform in Civil Service and Pensions. 
Following the undesirable appointments, Hull chose to devote little 
time to the two committee assignments and to concentrate his efforts on 
national issues. The novice representative decided to specialize on the 
23iiull, op. cit. , I ,  43-44. 
24' 
Hinton, �- cit. , 108. 
2 5  ·. · Hull; £E• cit. , I,  45. 
26iiinton, op. cit. , 108. 
11 
tariff issue and to advocate the adoption of an income tax as the better 
method of raising revenue.27 Thus Hull associated himself with the early 
progressive·movement which has left a lasting refonn effect on the Ameri­
can political scene. 
27Hull, �· cit., I,  5 1-53. 
CHAPTER II 
AUTHOR OF INCOME TAX IAW 
Cordell Hull .. ' s first two terms in Congress (December 2, 1907 -
March 4, 1911) were mainly concerned with the passage of an income tax 
measure. In addition, he unsuccessfully introduced other legislation of 
local interest, a sampling of which includes attempts to construct an 
observatory for the Weather Bureau on Crab Orchard Mountain, to erect 
a public building at Dayton, and to improve the Obed River. The bill 
which he introduced to erect a public building at Cookeville, however, 
did pass Congress and became law.1 On December 19, 1907, with less 
than three weeks of congressional experience, Hull introduced before 
Congress the bill2 which was later to give him the deserved recognition 
3 as author of our modern income tax law. This bill, House Resolution 
10548, called upon the Congress "to provide revenue for the Government 
by levying an income tax . . .·" and was referred to the Republican-dominated 
Committee on Ways and Means.4 Later in the same session of Congress, Hull 
offered a House resolution directing the Ways and Means Committee "to 
1Hinton, op. cit., 113, 122. 
2congressional Record, 60 Cong., 1 sess., 443. Hereafter cited 
Cong. Rec. 
3"Frontispiece," The World's Fair, XXVI (July,.1913) , 242. 
4 Cong. Rec., 60 Cong., 1 sess., 443. 
12 
13 
report bills reducing import duties and income-tax bflls .• " This, too, 
was referred to a committee� 5 
Legislatively, at the time of the introduction of an income tax, 
it was considered a dead issue.6 This was in view of the fact that the 
United States Supreme Court in the Pollock.decision of 1895 had ruled 
the income tax section of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, passed by a_Demo­
cratic Congress in 1894, as invalid.7 Benton M�illin, Hull's Congress­
man at that time, was largely responsible for its drafting and adoption. 8 
The law was ruled unconstitutional "upon.the ground that a tax imposed 
upon income derived from real estate or invested personalty was a direct 
tax, and must therefore be levied by the rule of apportionment."9 In­
teresting is the fact that during. the Civil War, in 1862, a similar law 
was enacted, which remained in effect until 1872 without legal difficul-
t. 10 1.es. Later, in the next Congress, Hull called attention to the partisan 
nature of the income tax issue, pointing.out that one of the "axioms" 
listed in the Republican Party's "campaign textbook" in.1894 had declared: 
"In this country an income tax of any sort is odious, and will bring.odium 
upon any party blind enough to impose it . . . .  Prepare for the funeral of 
the political party which imposes such a burden. 1111 
51 bid. , Index, 481. 6Hull, £E_. cit .  , I, 48. 
7John D. Hicks, George E. Mowry, and Robert E. Burke, The American 
Nation (Fourth Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), 197. 
8Hull, £E· cit., I, 49. 
9cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 sess. , Appendix, 102. 
10Paul M. Angle, Crossroads: 1913 (Chicago: . McNally and Co. , 
1963), 153. 
11  Cong. Rec. , 61 Cong., 1 sess. , 4405. 
14 
In Hull's maiden congressional speech, March 18, 1908, he em­
phasized the fairness and equity of an income tax and declared that 
12 
nine-tenths of the Democratic Party favored such a tax. Speaking on 
the floor of the House a year later, on March 29, 1909, Hull turned his 
attention to the tariff issue, and once again outlined the merits of a 
comprehensive income tax. As other observers had noted, he felt that 
even though the Republican platform of 1908 had promised a lower tariff, l 
the pending Payne Tariff Bill was more "upward than downward." He de­
clared that it was an attempt of a majority of the Ways and Means 
Committee to continue the alliance "with the protected interests and the 
trusts." Hull asserted that "the footprints of every protected favorite 
may be found around the items in which each is respectively interested." 
Thereupon, Hull presented his pleas for the adoption of an income 
tax as the most satisfactory method for raising revenue. In addition to 
citing other authorities, he emphasized that Adam Smith had written that 
"the Income Tax is the fairest, the most equitable system of taxation that 
has yet been devised." In attempting to offer the income tax as an 
amendment to the Payne Tariff Bill, he pointed out that the proposed 
amendment, with the omission of those provisions found unconstitutional 
in 1895, embraced the essential parts of the income tax law of 1894.13 
Since the House was still under the control of Speaker Cannon, the lower· 
14 body was not allowed to vote on the proposed amendment. 
121bid., 60 Cong., 1 sess., 3520. 
13Ibid., 61 Cong., 1 sess., 532-534. 14Ibid., 4401. 
15 
Concerning the taxation of wealth, Hull stated, "I have no dis­
position to tax wealth unnecessarily or unjustly, but I do believe the 
wealth of the country should bear its just share of taxation." He-felt 
that the major burdens of government had long been "borne by those least 
able to bear them," whereas, accumulated wealth had for many years en­
joyed the fruits of protection, and thus avoided paying its fair share 
of the government's financial burdens. He insisted that no state or the 
federal government had passed a tax law which affected those of sub­
stantial wealth. The young Congressman voiced his belief "that this 
class of wealth would not and could not seriously object to the pay­
ment of reasonable taxes in order to give some relief to the man of 
moderate means. " 
During the same speech, Hull also pre sented his attitude towards 
the taxation of inheritances . It was his contention that the right to 
transmit property was not a "natural one," but was "more in the nature 
of a privilege granted the citizen by law. " Since the citizen in the 
process of accumulating wealth had been protected by ·the laws of his 
state and the federal government, he felt it was only natural or practi­
cal that the government should be compensated for its part. This he 
believed should be only in the form of a reasonable tax "upon the trans-
. . f 1 
15 
mission o swol en and other fortunes." 
15Ibid. , 533-535. 
16 
A division in the Republican Party, which finally culminated in 
the battle between the Taft Republicans and the Roosevelt Progressives 
16 in the 1912 election, widened as each day passed. The Progressives 
supported the Democratic view towards a general lowering of the tariff, 
and this, of course, was in direct contrast to the traditional Republi­
can support of a high tariff. This was the group which had been able to 
force the Republican Party in 1908 to adopt as part of its platform a 
pledge to revise the tariff. In addition, the new element of the Re- . 
publican Party was an outgrowth of dissatisfaction with the limited 
number who had exercised control of the government for some time. The 
progressive Republicans aimed their attack at the group known as the 
"Old Guard Republicans," and primary targets were Senator Nelson Aldrich, 
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and House Speaker  Joseph Cannon.17 
Eventually, the Payne Bill passed the House with substantial down­
ward revision of the former Dingley Tariff. Nevertheless, it was still 
believed by the "Old Guard leaders" of the Senate that the previous high 
rates could be restored. Senator Aldrich's Committee on Finance quickly 
introduced a bill in the Senate with 847 amendments, the majority of 
which were increases; yet Aldrich boldly asserted that ' his bill would 
reduce the Dingley tariff." 18 It was then that the progressive Republi-
16 Hull, op. cit., I, 59. 
17Harry J. Carman and Harold C. Syrett, A History of the Ame rican 
People (2 vols., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1958) ,11-:-372. 
18Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century (New  York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960), 87-88-. -
J 
17 
cans, led by Senator Robert M. LaFollette, carefully studied the new 
tariff, produced tables, and concluded that the new tariff was about 1 .5 
per cent higher. Throughout the nation, particularly in the Middle West, 
indignation of the voters was aroused by the progressives' statistics. 
Thus the progressives, having gained public support, took the offensive. 
Taking advantage of public advocacy of tariff revision, President 
Taft convinced the conservatives who had eliminated the inheritance tax 
as part of the Payne bill "that they must accept a compromise." Other­
wise, they feared, the progressive Republicans would unite with the 
Democrats to enact a comprehensive income tax law as a substitute for 
the high tariff which heretofore had been relied upon for revenue pro­
ducing purposes .  The compromise was a two per cent tax on corporate 
incomes and the "submission to the states of an income-tax amendment to 
the Constitution, " which when ratified during the "progressive upsurge 
of 1911 and 1912,"
19 
became the Sixteenth Amendment on February 25, 19 13 .
20 
Due to the cleavage within the Republican Party, Senator Aldrich 
on June 28, 1909, introduced a Senate Joint Resolution as a.proposed amend­
ment to the Constitution. The proposed amendment declared that "Con-
gress shall have the power to levy and collect taxes on incomes from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, 
191 bid. 
20rhe Statutes1 ,!! Large of the United States of America� March, 
.!.2.!:.!, to March, � . , 1785. 
18 
and without regard to any census or enumeration." On July 5, 1909, the 
proposed amendment to the Constitution was unanimously passed by the 
Senate.21 
Four days later, Congressman Payne, Chairman of the House Way� 
and Means Committee, introduced in the House the resolution of the 
2 2  
Senate proposing to amend the Constitution. And on July 12, 1909, 
Congressman Hull expressed before the House his views of the change of 
attitude by the Republicans concerning the passage of an income tax. 
Hull exclaimed: 
During the past few weeks the unexpected spectacle of certain 
so-called "old-line conservative" Republican leaders in Congress 
suddenly reversing their attitude of a lifetime and seemingly es­
pousing, though with ill-concealed reluctance, the proposed 
income-tax amendment to the Constitution has been occasion of 
universal surprise and wonder.23 
Speaking further, Hull reviewed how he had introduced in the 
Sixtieth Congress an income tax bill encompassing the main features of 
the income tax law of 1894 with omissions of those provisions declared 
invalid by the Supreme Court. He pointed out that on the first day of 
the present session of Congress he again introduced this same bill. He 
explained that there were two methods by which Congress might secure its 
.taxing privilege. One alternative was "an amendment to the Constitution," 
2 1 Cong. Rec., 61 Cong., 1 sess. , 3900. 
2 2Ibid. , 4390. 
231 bid. , 4401. 
19 
and the second "was a reversal by the Supreme Court of its former deci­
sion." I n  reference to the two alternatives, Hull preferred "that Con­
gress first pursue the latter alternative." He continued to advocate 
the inclusion of an income tax clause in the Payne-Aldrich Bill, hoping 
that it would be upheld by the Supreme Court. 
Hull, in the same speech, pointed out that the Payne Bill was 
passed in the House without any income tax measure except for a section 
imposing an inheritance tax. During the debate on the Payne Bill, Hull 
said that he "watched every opportunity, as did other members of the 
minority, to offer an income-tax amendment, " but the iron-clad rules of 
the House would not allow the amendment to be offered. 
Hull continued in his speech to attack the "old-line Conservatives" 
and described, as has been presented in this chapter, how the progressive 
Republicans, backed by popular support, finally forced the conservative 
Republicans to adopt an income tax amendment to the Constitution. He 
felt that the conservative Republicans reasoned that the proposed amend­
ment to the Constitution would create a division among the supporters 
of an income tax. To create a division, Hull avowed, the Republicans 
led by Aldrich in the Senate had presented both a corporation tax 
amendment to the bill and an income tax amendment to the Constitution.24 
Hull felt that their idea was "to give an appearance of acquiescing in an 
24I bid. 
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income tax and at the same time kill it by substituting" for the income 
tax provision a like measure in the form of an amendment to the Consti­
. 25 tut1.on. 
They were\willing to submit the amendment to the Constitution to 
the states, Hull asserted, because they believed there was little likeli­
hood that three-fourths of the states would ratify it. Reasoning further, 
he emphasized that two thousand amendments to the Constitution had been 
introduced in Congress and only fifteen had been ratified by the states. 
Also, Hull brought out that according to the census of 1890 it had been 
statistically calculated that eleven states with 3.7 per cent of the 
nation's population could defeat an amendment. He indicated that since 
thirty-five state legislatures would not convene until 1911 the present 
"session of Congress should have enacted a comprehensive income-tax law 
and secured the judgment of the Supreme Court at an earlier date, as 
was done in 1895." He further contended that if the Supreme Court ruled 
the act invalid, the "pending amendment" could be submitted to the states 
without any additional delay. 
In discussing the prospects of an income tax law to stand the 
approval of the Supreme Court, Hull stated that the Pollock decision of 
1895 "wou'fd not stand-up again. " The Pollock case, which declared the 
previous income tax law unconstitutional, was, according to Hull, "one 
of the very rare instances in the Nation's judicial history in which it 
25 Hull, £2· cit., I,  60. 
is universally agreed that our greatest judicial tribunal on earth 
erred . "26 
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In concluding his speech of July 12, 1909, Hull strongly as­
serted that he would vote for the proposed amendment, and he hoped that 
both Democrats and Republicans would aid in securing its ratification; 
but he gave assurance that he would continue to maintain that the Pollock 
decision was wrong, and that he would continue to pre ss for an income 
tax law separate from the proposed amendment to the Constitution . While 
attacking the Republicans, he said: 
For it.has long been understood that the Republicans never 
support a worthy cause until.forced by public sentiment . Too 
stupid to devise and enact wholesome laws and to formulate and 
execute sound administrative policies, this piratic,, organiza­
tion is wont to wait until Democrats point the way . 
As the proposed constitutional amendment was being presented to 
the states, Hull continued to press for a direct income tax law. Dur­
ing the second session of the Sixty-first Congress, on January 27, 1910, 
he presented reports on eighteen foreign countries' systems of taxation, 
all of which included income taxes. Hull again argued that a compre­
hensive income tax would be fairer to all than the "present tariff 
monopoly law." Hull's other major points were that the rates could be 
easily changed, the income tax.would be productive, wealth could not 
evade an income tax, and since the income tax would be based on the 
26I bid . 
27cong . Rec. , 61 Cong . ,  1 sess . ,  4401-4405 . 
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ability to pay it could not be called socialistic. He referred to the 
fact that the greater portion of the nation's indirect taxation fell 
upon incomes of two thousand dollars and less. Thus he concluded that 
"this country is approaching a tax revolution. The defenders of privilege, 
so long triumphant, can not turn back the tide of fiscal reform. Their 
opposition is a challenge to the civilization and representative govern­
ment of our twentieth century. 1128 
Finally, in 1913, during the Sixty-third Congress, Hull was able 
to reap the fruits of his efforts for the adoption of a national income 
tax. The amendment to the Constitution had been ratified by the 
necessary states; a Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, was the new President; and 
both Houses of Congress were Democratic. 29 Previously, during· the 
Sixty-second Congress, Hull had been selected as a member of the Demo-
. . 30 b . . cratic House Ways and Means Committee. As a mem er of this co��ttee, 
Hull, in 1913, became author of our first permanent income tax measure, 
which was incorporated with minor changes from his original proposal 
within the Underwood Tariff.31 Interesting in respect to our present-
day scales, the provisions of the new income tax law allowed an exemp-
281 bid., 2 sess., 1109-1115. 
29 Hicks, et al.,££· cit., 365. 
30Edward G. Lowry, "The Tariff Reformers," Harper's Weekly, LV 
(Feb���ry 4, 1911), 8-9. 
� . . � . ... 
31Hinton, �· cit., 153. 
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tion of $3,000 for single persons and an additional $1,000 exemption 
for those married persons living together. The graduated structure's 
rates increased as follows: 1 per cent on income over $3,000 and less 
than $20,000; 2 per cent on income over $20,000 and less than $50,000; 
3 per cent on income over $75,000 and less than $100,000; 4 per cent on 
income more than $100,000 and less than $250,000; 6 per cent on income 
over $250,000 and less than $500,000; and all sums above $500,000 were 
taxed at 7 per ce nt.32 In the Senate Republican insurgents William E. 
Borah, J. L. Bristow, and Robert M. LaFollette all pressed for stiffer 
33 rates, but Hull was supported by President Wilson. The President, who 
took a keen  interest in the bill, realized it would be unpopular, and thus 
favored a bill that would be as unburdensome as possible to raise the 
necessary revenue.34 
During the framing of the income tax law, Hull received national 
publicity. The� York Times carried numerous articles describing Hull's 
role as author of the income tax section of the Underwood Tariff.35 A 
full-page picture of Hull was printed on the frontispiece of the national 
32 Cong.�·, 63 Cong. , 1 sess., Appendix, 358-359. 
33Angle, £E· cit., 153. 
34Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters (8 vols., 
Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and--aoiiipany, I nc., 1931), 
IV, 111. 
35New York Times Index, 1913. 
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magazine, The World's Work. 36 Thr�e magazines--The American Review of 
. --
Reviews, 37 The Literary Digest, 38 and Harper's Weekly39--contained por­
traits of Hull and articles commenting on the new income tax law and his 
contributions. Thus Hull, heretofore an obscure Representative from a 
little known area in Tennessee, become of national stature. By all he 
was held in high esteem for his well-grounded and thorough knowledge of 
tax measures. Champ Clark, Speaker of the House, later recorded: "In 
one branch of our financial system-�income taxes--Judge Cordell Hull of 
Tennessee is considered the fountain-head of information. He is the 
thorough master of that subject and is relied on implicitly as an authority 
40 by both the House and the executive departments." 
In January, 19 14, Hull was afforded the opportunity of speaking 
before the State Bar Association of New York. In this address, which 
typified many of his Congressional speeches, Hull once again outlined 
the history of taxation, stressed that the new income tax law was based 
36"Frontispiece," loc. cit. 
37"The Progress of the World, " The· American Review of.Reviews, 
XLVII (May, 19 13), 5 74. 
38"The Income Tax Under Fire," The Literary Digest, XIL (May 24, 
· 19 13), 1163 . 
391owry, loc. cit., 9. 
40champ Clark, � Quarter Century of American Politics (2 vols., 
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1920), II, 343. 
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on the ability to pay, and that more than fifty countries and states had 
adopted this method of taxation and none had repealed the measure . I n  
addition to a large portion of the speech devoted to various technical 
features of the law, Hull strongly answered in rebuttal concerning the 
preponderance of adverse criticism from the eastern section of the country. 
That area, upon the theory that it would unfairly contribute more taxes 
than any other section, strongly opposed the tax . I n  referring to N�w 
York as an example of the eastern section, Hull described the importance 
of New York as the great center of commerce of the nation, and then con­
tributed to remind the state that its concentrated wealth was only made 
possible by profits largely drawn from industries throughout the country. 
He concluded by denying "the right of wealth anywhere to segregate itself 
and then upon the plea of segregation to exempt itself from its fair share 
41 of taxes . "  
Later that year Hull received a heartening letter ·from William G . 
. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, who congratulated him on the re sults 
of the income tax law for the fiscal year which had ended June 30, 1914. 
Secretary McAdoo wrote: 
I am sure that you are as much gratified as I am with the 
showing. The law is new and, although unpopular in some quarters, 
it is not one-tenth as unpopular as partisan papers represent it 
and certainly not near so unpopular as the average men expected 
41cong. Rec. , 63 Cong. , 2 sess. , Appendix, 104-106. 
it to be . On the whole th�2
e is every reason to feel gratified 
with its success thus far. 
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I llustrating the contention of many leading nation-wide magazines 
that the additional tax on increased incomes was discriminatory against 
larger incomes, The American Review of Reviews stated that a 1 per cent 
income tax with an exemption of $1,000 v'would be more in accordance with 
the American spirit and with American common sense . 1143 Additional criti­
cism of the income tax law was made by Representative William E .  Humphrey 
of Washington44 in an introduction to an article published in several 
newspapers. Hull, on January 20, 1915, extending his remarks in the 
Appendix of the Congressional Record, described the contents of Humphrey' s 
introduction as "cheap, coarse, and abusive." Contending that the income 
tax law in our country had not created "one-fourth the criticism and con­
troversy" that other countries had experienced upon its enactment, Hull 
forcibly reminded the reader: 
I t  is not surprising that some highbound protectionists would 
oppose an income tax or any other honest tax designed to compel 
the wealth of the country to do what it has never done--bear its 
fair share of taxes. Neither is it surprising that the large 
owners of our wealth would, through any subservient newspaper or 
other available source, seek to prejudice any law of this charac­
ter, either by superficial criticism or by grossly misleading state-
ments . 45 
42Hu 11 , op . cit . , I , 7 4 . 
43 "The Progress of the World," loc . cit. 
44 Cong . Rec. , 63 Cong ., 3 sess . , Appendix, 156, I ndex, 6. 
45Ibid., Appendix, 156-157. 
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Finally, on January 24, 19 16, the Supreme Court in deciding the 
case of Frank g .  Brushaber , Appellant, versus Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, affirmed the constitutionality of the income tax law . The 
following day Hull received unanimous consent from the House that the 
above case be made a House document, and he was assured by his colleague, 
Congressman James R. Mann of Illinois, that ample copies of the decision 
would be printed by the Government Printing Office.46 
In other legislation of the Wilsonian period, the President was 
fortunate to have, in addition to Hull, a capable group of congressmen 
to assist him in the carrying-out of his objectives. Such men, all 
close colleagues of Hull, were Carter Glass of Virginia, who later be-
came Wilson's Secretary. of the Treasury, Henry T. Rainey of Illinois, 
Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, and Henry D. Clayton.of Alabama . 47 
Hull, as a part of this group, was helpful in his vote and support for 
the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 19 13, the Clayton Anti-Trust 
Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 19 14,48 and the Child Labor 
Act, the Federal Farm Loan Act, and the Federal Highway Act, all of 19 16 . 49 
Concerning the hotly contested prohibition question, Hull maintained 
that it should not be a national partisan issue, but believed it was a 
matter that should be decided by the states separately. Representing a 
46� . , 64 Cong . , 1 see s . ,  1538, I ndex, 9 .  
47Baker, 2£ ·  .£!!· , IV , 111 . 
48Hull, £E ·  cit . , I ,  7 2 - 73 .  
49cong . � · , 64 Cong . ,  1 sea s . ,  2 035 ,  8017 , 1536 . 
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district which was overwhelmingly dry, he was not in a position to act 
as he might have otherwise chosen . Hull was by no means an advocate of 
prohibition ; he merely cast his vote as an expression of his district's 
determined position. He never spoke publicly on the issue,50 and during 
the state-wide effort for prohibition in Tennessee in 1908, he discreetly 
remained outside the state . Nevertheless, the Anti-Saloon League listed 
• • 1 1  • 
1 
• • t l5 1  him as being a nomina partisan of its cause . 
Of importance would be a fuller account of Hull ' s  views on woman 
suffrage, which became the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. The Congressional 
Record includes no remarks other than his voting record on that subject. 
On May 2 1, 1919, Hull voted against the resolution proposing what became 
the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution extending suffrage to the 
women. In the Senate, Tennessee's Kenneth McKellar voted for its passage, 
whereas John Shields failed to vote.5 2  
Both Hull, in his Memoirs, and Hinton, in his biography, briefly 
mentioned the women's vote in connection with the Congressman ' s. bid for 
reelection in 1920. The two believed that the Republican women were 
willing to make the effort to vote for their candidate, while the Democratic 
women were content with staying at home . 53 Hull was defeated . Joseph W. 
Brimm, a native of Carthage and a high school student at the time of the 
election, related "that the women were not so much casting their vote 
50Hull, � · cit . ,  I, 140 . 
5 1H· . 180 inton, op. cit. , . 
52cong . !!.£ ·, 66 Cong. , 1 sess. , 635 . 
5 3iiull, � ·  cit., I, 115; . Hinton, op . cit. , 167. 
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for the Republican candidate as they were against Hul1. • •
54 
When elected 
chainnan of the Democratic National Committee in 1921, Hull declared 
"that he would seek above all to see that the Democratic women were 
5 5  
adequately represented. The following year, when running for his 
former seat in the House, Hull strongly encouraged Democratic women to 
vote. He won by a seven thousand majority, for which victory_ much 
56 
credit was due to the women in his district. 
On the political front in his home state, Tennessee, Hull for 
the most part avoided controversial matters. Nevertheless, in March, 
1915, he found himself in the middle of a bitter political fight with 
Luke Lea, the state's senior senator. Lea was highly intelligent, had 
been elected to the Senate when barely over the constitutional age of 
thirty, and owned an influential newspaper, the Nashville Tennesseean. 
On the other hand, Lea had a desire to dominate as much political 
activity as possible. Hull saw evidences of Lea's influence and pressure 
on state politics as well as on himself. Therefore, he determined to 
destroy Lea before the Senator was able to control completely future 
l. . 57 Tennessee po itics. 
Backed by Major James Stahlman of the Nashville Banner, another 
very influential newspaper, Hull personally talked with members of the 
54statement by Joseph W. Brimm, personal interview. 
S SH. . 167 inton , £2·  .£:! · ,  
57I bid., 77-78. 
56Hull, £E ·  cit. , I ,  115. 
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Democratic Executive Committee throughout the state in regard to Luke 
Lea, but his efforts met with little success. He then decided upon a 
new approach. He knew that as each day passed, Senator Lea was making 
strides through "promises or patronage" towards gaining control of the 
executive conunittee . He reasoned that the sooner Lea was defeated for 
the Senate, the quicker he would be destroyed. Thus, Hull sought to 
arrange the date for the primary election for Lea's seat one year earlier 
than scheduled . 
Finally, after delaying tactics by Lea's faction, the state 
committee met and voted to move the primary date forward to 1915. The 
result was that young Congressman Kenneth McKellar gained Lea's seat in 
the Senate. Thereafter, Hull steered clear of Tennessee politics until 
his successful Senate race in 1930 . In  the meantime, Lea had rebuilt 
his political machine and once again was Hull's opponent� 58 
In summary, like many of the younger and more liberal members of 
the Democratic Party, Hull was tremendously attracted to Woodrow Wilson. 
With firm dedication, he worked for the President's political, economic, 
and social goals. He became labeled--and proudly so--a Wilsonian Demo­
crat . Having established himself as a leading.financial expert through 
his familiarity with the tariff and income tax, he was prepared for 
the fiscal challenges of World War I .  The nation's President and leaders 
were to become grateful for this service. 
581 bid . ,  78 - .79 . 
CHAPTER III  
WORLD WAR I :  GUARDIAN OF THE TREAS URY 
From the outbreak of World War · I in July, 1914, the maturing 
Representative Cordell Hull, now forty-three years old and having served 
three uninterrupted terms in Congress, was to find himself once again 
confronted with the nation's fiscal problems and responsibilities .  Be­
fore, during, and imme diately following the United States '  participa­
tion in the world-wide conflict, Hull was to play a dominant role in the 
determination of the country's financial responsibilities . . This period 
covered the Sixty�third through the Sixty-fifth Congresses, all of which 
were Democratic . From September 25, 1914, when Hull before the House 
warned America of the gravity of the European conflict and its glaring 
international repercussions, 1 through February 26, 19 19, when again be­
fore the same body he declared that the American citizens could and 
should exhibit their patriotism and appreciation of the heroism of their 
2 soldiers by the purchase of Victory Bonds, the Representative was to 
offer his assistance within four maj or areas of financial leadership. 
Various war revenue bills calling for increased taxes, the financial 
and commercial benefits of an improved Cumberland River, the securing 
of the passage of the inheritance tax, and the five bond drives were all 
given thorough and shrewd treatment by Hull . 
1cong . Rec., 63 Cong., 2 sess., 15721-15722. 
2I bid. , 65 Cong . ,  3 sess. , 4340. 
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Because of the existing war conditions , Hull , on September 25 , 
1914 , advocated the passage of an increased "emergency" income tax.3 
He was most critical of the Repu�lican opposition to the bill , and 
pointed out that when the Democrats had been in the minority during 
the Spanish-American War , although they had suggested economy , they were 
willing to cooperate with the opposing party in the best interests of the 
nation ' s  security . In  his opening remarks , he declared: 
Mr. Speaker , if playing politics in the face of a great crisis 
were proof of patriotism , I could pronounce a eulogy_ upon the Re­
publican side of the House that would place them in the category 
of the truest band of patriots to be found upon this planet. Dur­
ing my entire service here--in fact , during my entire life--1 have 
never seen any assemblage of grown-up. men reduced to such serious 
and desperate straits that they were willing to lay aside their 
judgment , the facts , the reason , and the patriotism of the situa­
tion and devote their efforts to the propagation of extreme , hide­
bound , stand-pat partisanship.4 
During the same speech , Hull defended the recently enacted Under­
wood Tariff , explaining that its failure to produce the necessary revenue 
to operate the government was due to the chaotic international trade 
conditions . Hull indicated that by taking. the minimum of monthly cus­
toms revenue loss since the war had started the United States Treasury 
would suffer a deficit of more than sixty million dollars. He violently 
criticized the Republicans for not at least offering a . concrete alterna­
tive to the existing methods of taxation . Realizing the disastrous 
political implications embodied for hie opponents in support of such a 
cause, he insisted that if they were really sincere in the ir criticisms 
31 bid. , 63 Cong. , 2 sees., 16964. 
41 bid. , 15721. 
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of the Underwood law, they would make every effort t� repeal the law 
with its income tax prov�sion and reenact the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. In 
his final remarks in advocating an additional tax, Hull stated his plea 
in the form of a sununation of the world situation with a £inn attack 
upon the opposing political party. He declared : 
This is an extraordinary tax imposed for extraordinary pur­
poses. While we are not actually at war, we are actually facing 
war conditions as much or more, in some respects, than if we were 
at war. Our international trade was never better than during the 
Spanish-American War. But the only answer we get from gentle­
men on the other side in their political extremities and in their 
favorite pastime of undertaking to bunko the people again is that 
we ought to be economical. My God ! A political organization 
that raised the ordinary national expenses of the Government 
from $460,000,000 in 1897 to $982,000,000 in 1913, more than 
doubled; first a billion-dollar Congress, and, second, as rapidly 
as they could get to it, a two-billion dollar Congress--they turn 
around and confront us with the impudent suggestion that we saould 
be economical . �aughter and applause on the Democratic side J 
They say that this Underwood law that is helpless to protect the 
Treasury in times of peace and in times · of normal trade is amply 
able, it has such great recuperative power in a time of war, that 
it will bring in ample revenue to meet all w�.i; emergencies. 
�aughter and applause on the Democratic side J 5 
Actually, Hull pointed out in a later speech that the Underwood 
tariff had been successful in peace time . In the appendix of the Con­
gressional Record, Hull inserted a reply to an editorial of the Washing­
ton Herald, which had complained that the Underwood revenue law had not 
produced the necessary revenue before the war commenced. Hull argued 
that when comparing. receipts under the·two laws of 1909 and 1913, one 
would of necessity include with the Underwood tariff receipts the amount 
5I bid., 15722 . 
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of revenue secured from the income tax levied for the purpose of "dis­
placing a corresponding amount of the Payne tariff law." Hull concluded 
that by adding the tariff receipts and the income taxes together during 
the nine months of peace the Underwood tariff had been in operation , the 
two had secured an additional $ 1 6 , 000 , 000 over what the Payne· Tariff and 
the Payne corporation excise tax would have procured during the same 
• • 6 period of time. 
Although as a "guardian of the treasury" Hull was interested in 
reducing domestic expenditures because of disturbed world conditions and 
eventually the participation of the United States in World War I ,  he 
made one important exception to this point of view. This was in regard 
to his pet project as a congressman , the improvement of the navigation 
of the upper Cumberland River for the special benefit of his constitu­
ents. As early as 1886 Congress had approved the locking and damming 
of the upper portion of the Cumberland River from Nashville to its head­
waters of navigation at Burnside, Kentucky--a distance of 325 miles. 
Thus, many of the locks and dams were to be constructed in counties 
represented by Hull. In February, 1906 , a board of engineers , follow­
ing a hearing in Nashville , made a report recommending a modification of 
the upper river project to the extent that many of the locks and dams 
proposed previously between Carthage and Burnside were to be eliminated. 
On the grounds of this report that many of the locks and dams were not 
presently justified by the commerce involved , Congress adopted the report 
61 bid. , Appendix , 1044-1045. 
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in the River and Harbor Act of March 2, 1907 . 7 
On April 3, 1909 , Hull insisted that the upper Cumberland River 
should be improved in the near future. He called attention to the great 
amount of mineral and timber resources of this section of the Cumberland 
Valley, which was inaccessible because of inadequate water transporta­
tion. He also stressed that the commerce of the Cumberland River ex­
tended to the most important parts of the Mississippi River and would be 
measurably increased by the improvement of the upper Cumberland. More­
over, the river was suitable for locking and damming due to its rock 
bottom, steep banks, and uniform width, and building materials were 
8 accessible nearby. Disagreeing with the engineers ' report, he con-
tinued: 
The fact that since 188 3  this river above Nashville has been 
recommended by all the engineers in charge as suitable for im­
provement by locks and dams, and highly worthy, should be borne 
in mind. The fact, also , that Congress concurred in this con­
clusion in the river and harbor act of 188 6 ,  and heartily adhered 
to it until 190 6 , having made numerous appropriations in accord­
ance therewith, should not be overlooked. None of this board 
have seen this section of the river.9 
During later sessions of Congress prior to World War I, Hull con­
tinued to fight unsuccessfully for appropriations for the upper portion 
of the Cumberland River project. On March 19 , 1912 , while describing 
the Cumberland River as "a magnificient stream of nearly 500 miles of 
navigable river, " he referred to the upper portion of the river as "com­
prising 200 miles running through the greatest undeveloped forest and 
71 b-fd., 61 Cong . ,  1 sess., 941. 
81 bid. , 942 . 
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mineral region south of Pittsburgh without railroads or other suitable 
transportation facilities." He believed that these 200 miles had pro­
duced more commerce even in its unimproyed condition than many of the 
rivers which had had millions of dollars expended upon them in the build­
ing of locks and dams. Yet, because of the report of the engineers in 
1906, there was no improvement of the upper river to be contemplated, 
"at least during their generation. "lO 
On September 2 1, 1914, Senator Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, former 
chairman of the House Rivers and Harbors Committee, opposed the Cumber­
land River project. Burton based his attack on the summary of engineer 
reports on the project as of October 29, 1912, on the population census 
of 1900, and on a personal visit to the area. Burton indicated there 
would be only a small amount of traffic on the river in comparison to its 
cost for improvement, that it was already navigable for six months of the 
ye�r, that a small population of 30,000 would not justify its improve­
ment, and that the upper portions of the river "were rocky and steep.1 111 
Both Tennessee Senators, John K .  Shields and Luke Lea,. defended the 
project. Senator Shields related that the Chief of Engineers knew that 
there were over 300,000 people living in. the area and that commerce had 
doubled since the last engineers' report. Senator Lea, in a questipn 
and answer type discussion with Burton, carefully led the Ohio Senator 
101 bid . , 62 Cong. , 2 sess. , 3652.  
11rbid. , 63 Cong . ,  2 sess . ,  15450. 
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into reluctantly admitting that possibly the population figures he used 
l ' d  12 were not va i .  
Senator Burton claimed that although in October, 1912, the Board 
of Engineers had again made a report against the project ; 1 j  within only 
fourteen months the report was changed due to the influence of many repre­
sentatives and senators. Attending the meeting held in  January, 1914, 
which according to Burton resulted in the board's favorable report, were 
Senator John Shields and Congressmen Cordell Hull, Joseph Byrns, Kenneth 
McKellar, and John Moon of Tennessee. From Kentucky were Senator Ollie 
James and Congressmen Alben Barkley, Harvey Helm, Swagar Sherley, Augustus 
Stanley, and Caleb Powers. Burton revealed that Hull opened the discus­
sion and that his remarks were recorded in about the first three of the 
, h ' 14 report s t irty pages. 
In his speech on September 29, 1914, Hull declared that Senator 
Burton sought to destroy a project without sufficient evidence. He felt 
that Burton seriously reflected "upon the fairness and freedom from bias 
of those gentlemen' ' from the Department of Engineers. He claimed that 
the truth regarding the· favorable report which changed the board's mind 
was that in a meeting in December, 1912, it was found that there was 
actually twice as much commerce on the river as had been supposed . Hull 
stated that only three congressmen and two businessmen were present at 
this meeting. At the same time he expressed his willingness in view of 
12�. , 15452 -15453. 
13A search was made for the Board of Eng ineers' report, but 
apparently it was not printed . 
14Ibid. 
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the pressing war conditions to forego his efforts on the project until 
a future date.15 
During the following session of Congress, the project was again 
omitted from . the river and harbor appropriation bill, due to the finan­
cial conditions of the country.16  Finally, Hull began to push for ap­
propriations for the project. On April 8, 1916, he declared that the 
project, despite the misunderstanding of many, was never completely 
eliminated. He said the Department of Engineers, not having ample in­
formation as to the amount of commerce, had only temporarily discon­
tinued the undertaking. After having learned, in December, 1912, the 
real facts concerning the amount of commerce on the river, the entire 
Department of Engineers recommended the restoration of the original 
plan . for the improvement. In 1914 the report was in turn approved by 
both the Rivers and Harbors Committee in the House and unanimously by 
the Senate Commerce Committee, only to be set aside due to the war 
17 - effort. 
I n  the early part of 1917, Hull urged upon Congress the necessity 
of completing . the project apd recalled the following critical happening : 
There is the greatest urgency. I remember that during last 
fall there was. a coal famine throughout the lower Cumberland 
River section, along the railroads even, when the people were 
utterly unable to secure coal on account of freight congestion 
all over the country. If  the river had been open to navigation 
the people throughout the lower Cumberland and Tennessee and 
Ohio and· Mississippi Valleys would have had the most ample 
supply of coal at the lowest possible prices. 18 
151 bid. , 15917. 
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Finally, during the third and last session of the Sixty-fifth 
Congress in July, 1919, after the war was over , Hull and other interested 
Tennesseeans and Kentuckians were able to reap the rewards of their years 
of unrelenting efforts in behalf of the Cumberland River project . Con­
gressmen from both states were instrumental in securing the coveted 
appropriations in the general Rivet and Harbor Bill, which was signed . 
by President Wilson on March 2, 1919. The new law included provisions 
calling for the expenditure of $4, 500, 000 "for the complete canaliza­
tion of the upper Cumberland River from Burnside, Kentucky, to Nashville, 
Tennessee, " and made an immediate sum of $340, 000 available for the pur­
chase of the necessary lock and d�m sites. in the two states . 19 
Hull, too, ably led in the securing of the passage of the �n­
heritance tax. � The New York Times on May 22, 1916, reported that Hull, 
who had written the income tax section of the Underwood Tariff was also 
the committee expert on the inheritance tax section of the forthcoming 
revenue bill. The article related that Hull had spent several months 
of preparation in examining the · inheritance tax laws of other nations. 20 
On various occasions he was outspoken before Congress in pointing out 
the practicality of the inheritance tax as a supplement to the income 
tax . Following extensive research,2 1  on July 8, 1916, Hull, address­
ing the House of Representatives, advocated the adoption of the estate 
tax in the following manner: 
l9� . ,  65 Cong . ,  3 sess . , Appendix 220. 
2.PNew York !.!!!!, May 22, 1916 . 
2 1Huli, 2.2 · � . ,  I, 80. 
I found, Mr . Chairman, as has been suggested by some of the 
ablest economical writers and students in. this country, that 
the inheritance tax is absolutely - equitable and just. I found 
that it is, possibly, the oldest tax law in existence . It  is 
common to every country, old and young, large and small, through­
out the world . It is the quickest and easiest tax collected that 
can possibly be devised . Some countries, with half our wealth, 
have been during peace and normal times realizing more than 
$ 100, 000, 000 on this particular tax levy, and without complaint 
from anybody . 22 
40 -
Continuing in the same speech, Hull confessed that he along with 
many others had . formerly favored reserving to the states the inheritance 
tax as a source of currency. Hull explained that his reason for change 
was due to the federal government's urgent and probably future need of 
"internal taxes for more than $500, 000, 000 of revenue. 1 1 23 It was Hull's 
contention that the states, although through no fault of their own, had 
been most inefficient in the collection of this source of revenue. He 
felt that the states were hampered by the lack of jurisdiction, double 
taxation resulting from conflicting state laws, impediments in reaching 
intangible and other personal property, and conflict as to the residence 
of the decedent which frequently resulted in prolonged legal contro­
versies. He also pointed out that when one state increased its estate 
rates, often the wealthy taxpayers would change their domicile to a state 
having either lower rates or no rates at all. In New York, according . to 
Hull, $400, 000, 000 had been taken from the state within the first eight 
months following the enactment of increased rates. Thus, "it is utterly 
22cong. Rec . ,  64 Cong. , 1 sess . ,  10656. 
231 bid. In Hull's Memoirs, he recorded that in early 1 9 1 5  
$300, 000, 000 to $400 , 000, 000 could be secured by an inheritance tax. 
Hull, op. cit. , 77. 
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impossible, "  Hull contended, "for the states to secure any sort of uni­
fonnity with respect · to these handicaps. 1 1 24 
Continuing his speech in support of an estate tax, Hull asserted 
that there was a general demand among the citizens for a "substantial 
tax on the transmission of property. " He indicated that "in view of the 
far greater revenue requirements of the Federal Government and the com­
paratively small amount of taxes" secured by many states in seemingly 
fruitless experimentation with the inheritance tax, the only recourse 
was for the federal government to adopt the measure. He crystallized 
his point by presenting statistics showing that of the forty-two states 
having an inheritance tax, most recent accounts established that only 
$29, 000, 000 had been captured by the states, whereas England, with less 
than half our wealth, had in the past few years annually procured over 
$100, 000, 000 from an estate tax.25 
In expressing a need for state and federal coordination, Hull 
reasoned that eventual unifonnity of inheritance tax laws gained through 
federal . taxation would allow the states to receive a greater amount than 
presently received . His plan was for the federal government to secure 
$150, 000, 000 by the estate tax measure and reserve one-third of the yield 
for the states . . This, Hull declared, while contemplating fonnally in­
troducing the idea in the form of a bill at a later date, would nearly 
24 Cong. Rec. , 64 Cong., 1 sess., 10 656-10 657 . 
251 bid . 
42 
double the amount of revenue previously derived from state laws . 26 
In support of the pending_ estate tax bill, as introduced by Rep­
resentative Claude Kitchin on July 1, 1916, Hull believed that the rates 
when considered as a supplement to state taxes on shares of estates would 
be more equitable, just, and reasonable than past methods. He felt 
that the proposed estate tax would "harmonize with the present income 
tax law in that the estate tax would come from those receiving unearned 
income and not from those receiving earned income . " He explained that 
the proposed inheritance tax of $50, 000, 000 would be less than one�half 
of one per cent of the present $ 12, 000, 000, 000 increase of national 
wealth ; · thus, capital would never be touched. At the same time, Hull 
continued to stress the feasibility of an inheritance tax of $ 150, 000, 000. 
Substantiating this point, Hull again mentioned England's success with 
�his method of taxation, and stated that a percentage of only one and 
one-half per cent of the average $ 10, 000, 000, 000 annual increase of 
national wealth for .the past eight years would be necessary for its 
. 28 operation. 
In  closing his speech, Hull expressed the thought that the pro­
posed estate tax "is not within itself a comprehensive bill but is 
primarily intended to aid in meeting the temporary and extraordinary 
armament expenditures. " He indicated, too, that if the present trend 
of the federal government's taking over many substantial expenditures 
previously assumed by the states continued, it was of necessity that the 
26Ibid., 10657 . 27Ibid., 10372. 28Ibid. 
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· federal government adopt the estate tax . Hull again stressed coopera­
tion between the states and the federal government . He asserted that 
through the use of both an equitable income and inheritance tax by each 
and with a well-balanced system of reciprocal coordination of tax records 
by the two, the states could repeal their general property tax systems . 29 
Opposition to the inheritance tax stemmed mostly from various 
states wishing to safeguard their exclusiveness to this method of taxa­
tion . The states, too, found backing for their cause from the Republi­
can Party . New York and Rhode Island strongly opposed the tax. New York 
declared it regarded the estate tax as ' 'strictly and naturally a source 
of state revenue, " could not financially sacrifice the $11, 000, 00 raised 
annually from the inheritance tax, and that double taxation would result 
from the enactment of a federal inheritance tax . Rhode Island based her 
opposition on similar reasoning .  One Republican, Representative Charles 
F. Curry of California, indicated that forty-two states collected in­
heritance taxes and that the federal government h�d no right to make use 
of that source of revenue. 
The estate tax bil l  was, eventual iy passed by both Houses of Con­
gress and signed by President Wilson on September 8, 1916 . The new law, 
our first federal estate tax , became known as the Estate Tax Act of 
1916.30 Although the higher rates advocated by Hull were not applied , 
he inserted many of the provisions of inheritance tax and estate tax laws 
29I bid. 30� . ,  14158 . 
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from other countries into the successful bill . 31 Just as the income tax 
rates of 1913 prove most interesting to today's reader, the same applies 
to the estate rates of 1916. The rates on the estates as graded were as 
follows : 
Up to $50, 000 1 per cent 
$50, 000 to $ 150, 000 . 2 per cent 
$ 150 J OOO to $250, 000 � 3 per cent 
$250, 000 to $450, 000. 4 per cent 
$450, 000 to' $ 1, 000, 000. . 5 per cent 
$ 1, 000, 000 to $ 2, 000, 000 . 6 per cent 
$2, 000, 000 to $3, 000, 000. 7 per cent 
$3, 000, 000 to $4, 000, 000. 8 per cent 
$4, 000, 000 to $5, 000, 000. 9 per cent 
Over $5, 000, 000 10 per cent . 32 
It should be pointed out also that as the war progressed and United 
States debts soared, the inheritance tax rates were successively ·raised 
to meet the added financial expenses. The idealistic Democrat, Hull, 
naturally supported the upward revision of the estate tax rates. 33 
Hull, too, as previously described, following the outbreak of World 
War · I ,  continued to advocate additional revenue by means of increased in­
come taxes. Time and again Hull assisted in the drafting of successive 
revenue bills calling for greater taxes and offered his close scrutiny 
as to the proposed bills' capabilities of producing the necessary revenue . 
As in former sessions of the House, partisanship was characteristic of 
,• 
Hull's speeches in which he ridiculed the Republican Party . The 
addresses were marked too by that which is obviously experienced during 
31Hull, £E ·  cit. , I,  80. 
321 1The Rising Cost of Inheriting $10, 000, 000, " The Literary 
Digest, LIV (February 17, 1917), 444. 
33cong. Rec . , 65 Cong. , 2 sess. , Appendix, 641. 
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every war--emotionalism and the theme that all should unite and "rally 
to the colors . "  
Speaking before the House, on December 16, 1916, Hull voiced his 
approval and support of the continuance of the emergency revenue act 
passed during October of 1914 . 34 He exclaimed that the conditions re­
quiring the continuance of the existing emergency tax law were even more 
apparent than they had been earlier . . Taking a jab at the Republican 
Party for its reluctant support of the proposed tax measure, Hull re­
marked: 
We are confronted by a Republican minority which seems to be 
disappointed, desperate, and mad . They seem to be mad because 
their wonderful prophecies of dire calamity that would sweep 
over this country under · a Democratic administration and a Demo­
cratic tariff law have been blown to atoms and have proven false 
in every particular. They appear to be desperate because under 
this administration and under the present tariff law we did not 
have a recurrence of those awful calamitous conditions that 
visited this country under the panic of 1907
3 
when the Dingley 
high-protective tariff law was in operation. 5 
In March, 1916, Newton D .  Baker, Wilson ' s  Secretary of War, asked 
Congress for $8, 000, 000 to provide for the expenses of General Pershing's 
troops on the Mexican border. It was obvious that military expenditures 
would continue to expand and that the treasury would encounter difficult 
problems of financing.36 The New York Times, on March 24, 1916, recorded 
Hull's reaction and his closeness to the administration :  
341 bid . ,  63 Cong., 2 sess . , 16964 . 
351 bid . ,  64 Cong . ,  1 sess . ,  341 .  
36H . 1.nton, op . cit . ,  152 . 
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Representative Hull of Tennessee, of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, who has kept in close touch with both President Wilson 
and Secretary McAdoo in regard to revenue raising, said today 
there need be no concern as to means of providing any necessary 
funds. He explained there were sources open without furthe r 
legislation--the 3 per cent Panama Canal bonds, long term , of 
which $240,000,000 may yet be issued, and the $200,000,000 of 3 
per cent certificates authorized under the Dingley tariff law. 
Mr. Hull also called attention to the fact that the Treasury 
probably received this year the largest revenue in its history.37 
On July 8, 1916, Hull once again directed toward the Republican 
Party his attack for its vain attempts to delay the eventual passage of 
the proposed revenue bi1138 for which he had worked so prodigiously . 
He stated: 
This bill embraces a number of most important tax provisions , 
and , in my judgment , it is a matter of deep regret that the membe r­
ship here has avoided their discussion, except to a very pa�tial 
extent, but insisted as a rule upon rehearsing and rehashing. old . 
campaign speeches. Of course I can understand and appreciate the 
severe stress of politics, as it appears to so�e of my ultrastand­
pat friends in the House; but laboring under these conditions, it 
does seem to me having several weeks ahead of us we could have de� 
livered our campaign speeches later on and consumed the time 
allotted to this debate in an elaborate explanation and discussion 
of the merits and demerits of these tax proposals for the informa­
tion and bene fit of our respective constituencies.39 
In the same speech Hull exhibited a fervent display of patriot-
ism in answer to an addre s s  by Representative Frederick H .  Gillett of 
Massachusetts . 40 Gillett declared it was a partisan measure drafted 
and supported by the Democratic Party . . He believed a majority of its 
own party could secure its passage and that Republican votes were only 
37New York Times, March 24, 1916. 
38 Cong. �. , 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1415 8. 
391 bid. , 10651. 40L_b1.· d . , I d 8 n ex, 
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a matter of record . Gillett declared that the purpose of a revenue bill 
from a Republican viewpoint was protection. Thus, the Republicans should 
not support the bill .
41 Hull, on the other hand, contended that Con­
gressman Gillett had "practically notified the House t t  that he and others 
would ·impede the preparedness legislation not enacted unless there were 
tax provisions which would virtually guarantee the "former creatures of 
special privilege" such as the United States Steel Trust and the American 
Woolen Trust a sizeable profit . It was inconceivable to Hull that anyone 
who had previously advocated this legislation, unless "bluffing or play­
ing politics," would alter his position when the nation was reaching the 
most important stage of the enlargement of its Army and Navy and the 
h . f . f . f. . 42 strengt ening o its orti ications. 
In a spirit of high regard for the historical patriotism demon­
strated by those of meager incomes, Hull expressed his appreciation and 
referred to the age-old conflict of what is considered an equitable ap­
portionment of taxes . He exclaimed :  
Mr. Chairman,. it is axiomatic that every citizen owes certain 
duties to the Government under which he lives . He must pay taxes 
for its maintenance in time of peace and fight for its preserva­
tion in time of war. It is a great tribute to our citizenship of 
the past and present that those who have not had the ability to 
pay taxes have been ready and willing in times of danger to the 
nation to leave family and fireside and hazard both life and limb 
on the battle field in defense of our free institutions . The 
question of taxation is always serious and important. It has 
been, and e ver will be, a subject of constant controversy. An 
irrepressible conflict has bee n  waged for thousands of years 
411bid., 1 0 603 .  
421bid., 1 0 65 1 . 
between the strong and the weak, the former always striving to 
heap the chief tax burdens upon the latter. The conflict still 
continues.43 
48 
In the Appendix of the Congressional Record, May 22, 1917, nearly 
a month following the United States declaration of war, Hull extended 
his remarks concerning the successful enactment of another war revenue 
bill which became law on October 1, 1917.44 The bill embodied an addi­
tional $ 1, 800, 000 in revenue to come largely from an increased income 
tax and inheritance tax . While affirming his support of the bill, Hull 
declared the Ways and Means Committee on which he served had justifiably 
concluded that the greater portion of taxes should be gained through the 
taxation of wealth, luxuries, and pleasures. In evaluating the income 
tax as a revenue-producing device, he emphasized that in comparison to 
all other·methods of taxation the nation possesses, the income tax offers 
by far the largest source of revenue. Hull believed that its flexibility 
and great-revenue-yielding capacity had made it the backbone of any 
nation's program of financing in time of war. The usually modest Hull 1 
stated: 
It is with some pride that I contemplate the fact that this 
tax in which I have taken a keen personal interest during. my ten 
years' incumbency here is now ready to bring to the Federal 
Treasury a billion dollars annually, and more when necessary for 
the prosecution of the war against Germany. 45 
43I bid. , 10652. 
441 bid., 65 Cong. , 1 sess. , 7 7 73 . 
451 bid., Appendix, 227. 
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Fol lowing the - enactment of the war ·revenue act on October 1, 1917, 
there quickly  arose a controversy as to whether or not the salaries of 
senators and representatives in Congress would be subject to the excess­
profits tax. According to Hul l, the controversy was shifted by the press 
of the country to a general accusation that Congressmen had been exempt 
not from the excess-profits tax but from the income tax. Thus, Hul l  
wished to counteract the sweeping charges by making it cl ear to the nation 
that Congressmen ' s  salaries were not exempt from either form of tax. He 
reasoned that the Treasury "would and should rule that the salaries of 
Congressmen would be taxed on the theory · they were not Federal official s 
under the Constitution," and that they were not subject to the law of 
. . d . h '  h f. . . 46 A · . 1 exemption carrie wit in t e excess-pro its provision. Joint reso u-
tion embodying Hul l 's views was unanimously  adopted by the House. 47 
I n  the spring of 1918 Congress, having been in . session almost con� 
tinuousl y since the extra session in 1911, began to make definite plans 
for earl y adjournment. Although the war was stil l going on,. the � York 
Times carried an articl e on May 11, 1918, stating that Chairman Cl aude 
Kitchin . of the Ways and Means Conunittee and Senator Furnifold M. Simmons 
of the Senate Finance Committee both supported earl y adjournment and a 
special session to be cal l ed in November. I t  was also felt by most con­
gressmen that no l egislation was pressing and that Congress should take 
a rest. 
46I bid . , 2 sess . ,  522. 
47I bid., 525. 
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Hull felt differently ; he believed it would be a mistake to ad­
journ with no revenue laws enacted to tax the great amount of war profits. 
He felt that it would be too late in November for Congress to enact a 
revenue law which would affect the war profits for 1918 without the op­
position claiming retroactive legislation. Although the Treasury sup­
ported his views, discouraging to him was the fact that his arguments 
had little impact on members of Congress . 
Since it was the function of the House to initiate revenue legi•­
lation and Hull held membership on the committee with this responsibility, 
he felt justified in opposing the leaders of the House and Senate who 
favored early adjournment . In those circumstances, Hull prepared a 
thorough analysis of the entire financial situation and sent it on May 
15 to President Wilson . Throughout the war, Hull sent Wilson important 
memorandums direct, and the "President always replied in person. " In 
the letter, Hull strongly contended that Congress should not adjourn 
early but should remain and enact inmediate laws to impose greater taxes-­
particularly on the war profits . 
The following days, rumors circulated from the White House as to 
the contents of Hull's letter . Newspaper reporters quizzed Hull , who re­
mained quiet , wishing not to add to the controversy with leaders in the 
House and Senate . 48 A day later, the New York Times, although disclosing 
the major contents of Hull's letter, reported that within a week the 
48 Hull, �- cit . ,  I, 95-96. 
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letter would be made public . It revealed that Hull supported Secretary 
of Treasury McAdoo ' s  views that Congress should stay in session and pass 
additional revenue measures. The newspaper indicated that many high 
sources in Washington believed Wilson was the instigator of the letter 
in an effort to persuade Congress not to adjourn . The paper, too, re­
ported that Representative Kitchin was "not affected" by the letter, and 
maintained that additional revenue was unnecessary until the following 
year . Kitchin felt that a more adequate bill could be written after the 
h d 1 . f f  d '  49 government a a c ose view o uture expen itures. 
It is difficult to ascertain how much influence Hull's letter had 
on the President. Nevertheless, President Wilson, on May 28, made a 
personal appearance before Congress. He urged Congress to remain in 
session and enact legislation to reach the war profits . Later it was 
Hull ' s  belief that had Congress adjourned and waited until November fol­
lowing the Armistice , it would have been practically impossible to have 
increased the wartime rates.50 
On September 10, 1918, Hull, in a passionate support of the pas­
s age of the final war revenue bill, symbolic of the war fervor, declared : 
Mr. Chairman, Congress is now confronted with the solemn duty 
and the unusual responsibility of considering a measure which 
would levy a larger amount of taxes than has ever been imposed 
in the history of any nation. This tremendous undertaking on the 
part of the American people has been made necessary by the war 
for the suppression of rampant German militarism. The people of 
the United States, acting as a unit, are capable of doing big 
things, of meeting big responsibilities, and they will patriotically 
and unflinchingly shoulder this war-tax burden--one that no other 
49� York Times, May 17, 1918. 
SOHull, op. cit., I, 97. 
country, past or present, could undertake . Next to fighting in 
the front lines, there is no better test of patriotism than the 
willingness of the citizen cheerfully to pay the maximum amount 
of taxes for the support of the Government in its prosecution 
of the war . On the other hand, the lack, or the degrees, of 
patriotism can no more quickly be· detected than in the person 
who complains of, or resents, the payment of his fair share of 
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an imperatively high war-tax levy . Especially since the stupendous 
plans and purposes of the German autocracy to dominate first 
Europe and Asia, and then the Western Hemisphere, industrially, 
financially, commercially, socially, and politically, have so fully · 
and clearly unfolded themselves, no intelligent pe rson with a spark 
of patriotism or with the slightest love of liberty will hesitate 
to place both life and property at the dis:e,osal of his Government 
in this time of supreme crisis. [Applause � Even the casual reade r 
now knows that from the day of the Potsdam Conference on July 5, 
1914, world conquest and world domination were deliberately decreed 
by the ruling powers in Germany, and have since been most vigorously 
prosecuted by the German and its allied armies .  The most ignorant 
person is now familiar with the uncivilized savage and barbarous 
methods employed by the German Government in waging this unholy, 
outrageous, and unspeakable war of conquest . For brutality and in­
humanity, for duplicity and false pretense, for rape and robbery, 
for piracy and fiendish cruelty, for the malicious destruction of 
innocent lives and property, for the deliberate violation of the 
inalienable rights of both nations and individuals, for the utter 
and contemptuous disregard of every vestige of right, j ustice, 
honor, fair dealing, and moral sense, the conduct of the German 
overlords from the day they plotted and precipitated this war has 
been without parallel and without comparison, and has brought upon 
their heads a universal judgment of 'Fiminal infamy which a million 
years · of atonement can not remove. LApplause J Talk about "peace 
by negotiation ! "  How can you negotiate any question with scoundrels 
and villains, with assassins and freebooters, with highwaymen and 
desperadoes? They must first either be killed or disarmed, and the n  
let honorable men speak and act for their nation at the peace table .51 
During the same speech in connection with the war revenue bill, Hull 
outlined his thoughts concerning the coming postwar period. He referred 
to the fact that over a year before, on April 23, 1917,52 he had intro­
duced a resolution before Congress cal ling for "the organization of an 
51�. , 10160-10161. 521b1.' d . ,  1 991  sess . ,  . 
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international trade agreement congress. "53 Its purpose would "be to 
eliminate by mutual agreement all possible methods of retaliation and 
discrimination in international trade." Hull declared , "Economic wars 
are but the germs of real wars . "  Therefore , by the removal of the causes 
of war , he believed an international trade congress dedicated to the 
above purpose would measurably reduce the possibilities of economic war­
fare and greatly assist in the esta�lishment of healthier trade relations 
54 throughout the world. Interestingly , that same proposal made by Hull 
became point three of President Wilson ' s  fourteen points for a lasting 
peace. 55 
Beginning in 1916 Hull closely observed the thinking of organiza­
tions such as William Howard Taft's League to Enforce Peace , and of men 
such as Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge , who were all 
urging the formation of an association of nations after the war. Hull 
strongly believed in the idea. 56 
53I bid. , 2 sess. , 10 163. In February , 1916 , Hull made an extensive 
investigation of the various acts , methods , and policies practiced by 
many nations in their efforts for international trade �nd commercial ad­
vantages. Hull was convinced that many of the efforts were "illegitimate , 
unfair , and unequal in their effects on other nations . "  The result was 
a great amount of "friction , ill feeling , and bitter economic strife ! "  
between. the nations. At that time Hull prepared the above resolution 
calling for an international trade agreement congress to be held in Wash­
ington in which all nations should be participants. "After some con­
ference , "  Hull delayed the formal introduction of the resolution until 
April 23 , 1917, when he offered it in "modified form . "  I bid . ,  3 sees . , 
3955 . 
-
541 bid , 2 sess. , 10163. 
551 bid., 3 sess. l 3955. 
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Hul l ,  � ·  ill · , I ,  86. 
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Although he supported Wilson ' s  plan for a league of nations,  Hull 
believed that point three of the fourteen points was equally important. 
On February 21, 1919, he declared that the establishment of economic 
world pe ace was most needed and would not conflict with any plans for a 
league ·of nations, but on the other hand, "would supplement, strengthen, 
and make easier its operation," since there would be less commercial and 
trade disagreements for arbitration. Hull exclaimed that "commercial 
power means political power, and as a rule, military power as well , "  H� 
pointed out that history has revealed that most wars of recent times had 
arisen largely from "irritation, bitterness, jealousy, and strife" due 
. d ' ff 57 to economic .1. erences. 
Continuing in the same speech, Hull held that if all nations en­
gaged in commerce would agree to the principles of the most-favored nation 
58 clause in its entirety, virtually all discriminations would be removed. 
He believed that the colonial preference systems in which the mother 
country gives "preferences to the colonial products in her markets and 
vice versa" were in violation of the most-favored-nation principle. 
''Mother countries and not their colonies, " Hull contended, received the 
most benefit from the preference system. Although he felt that the 
preferential treatment should be abandoned in the "case of autonomous 
57 Cong.�·, 65 Cong. , 3 sess., 3956. 
58The most favored nation clause as practiced in Europe required 
"each nation to accord to the other as the party of the second part 
treatment which is or shall be accorded in a like matter to that nation 
most favored by it in another treaty." The United States at that time 
had failed to adopt the doctrine in its unconditional form and thus was 
not bound by the provisions, except with some limitations. Ibid . ,  3957. 
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or self-governing colonies, " he asserted the system should be allowed 
in the situation of "backward, uncivilized, or more or less dependent 
colonies" in which the mother country had made their interest dominant . 59 
During Worl War I Cordell Hull played a significant part in the 
raising of nearly $21, 500, 000, 000 by the floating of five bond issues.60 
On April 17, 1917, he inserted into the appendix of the Congressional 
Record his views concerning the first bond issue aggregating $ 7, 000, 000, 000 , 
. of which $3, 000, 000, 000 was loaned to the allied nations opposed to··Germany , 
He stated that what the Allies needed most of all was credit. He strongly 
held that "the most powerful blow the United States can strike at this 
early stage" was the procurement of credit to enable the allied armies 
to be supplied with the necessary food, materials, and equipment. This 
would allow the Allies to carry on the proper amount of warfare against 
the enemy . 61 The bill was passed unanimously by the House.62 
Within the same remarks, Hull included a discussion of the form 
of fiscal policies the government should adopt during the length of the 
591 bid . ,  3957-3958 . The United States accepted the doctrine in a 
conditionalform, which was that "the application of equality of treatment 
is conditioned upon the receipt from the other party to a treaty of a 
favor or a concession equivalent to that which was paid by the third 
nation to which the United States has accorded the favor or concession in 
question . "  The United States in 1922, however, adopted the unconditional 
interpretation, omitting the necessity for such a concession equivalent. 
Wallace Mitchell McClure, ! � American Commercial Policy (Vol , CXIV of 
Studies � History, Economics and Public � '  New York : Columbia Univer­
sity, 1924), 148 and 169. 
60Hicks, !! !_!. , op. cit. , 409. 
61 Cong. � · , 65 Cong . ,  1 sess., Appendix, 81 . 
62I bid . , · 690 . 
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war . He realized there would be "conflict of views" as to the most use-
ful method of taxation . He explained that the nation should be most 
careful in its approach since the ultimate method used would cause both 
immediate and long-term effects upon the nation' s economy . Hull indi­
cated that there was "no fixed rule" as to what portion of war expendi­
tures should be met by taxes or by bonds, but depended upon such factors 
as the nation's credit and the estimated cost and duration of the war . 63 
He expanded these views as follows : 
I repeat that in financing a great war no fixed rule as to the 
relative proportion of taxes and bonds is possible . The best 
policy is to levy the largest amount of taxes that can be imposed 
without actual and serious impairment or disruption of the normal 
business of the taxpayers, making increases in such tax levies as 
the war progresses and expenditures swell, and as business adjusts 
itself to the new condit ions which such tax levies create . The re­
mainder of the expenses should be met by the issuance of bonds . 64 
Continuing his remarks, Hull pointed out that the bonds made avail­
able to furnish loans to Allies should mature at a time when the Alli es 
65 would be capable of making the payments . As to bond issues for domestic 
war purposes, he asserted that a different rule should apply . He felt 
that the best policy would be to eliminate bonded indebtedness as quickly 
63rbid . ,  Appendix, 81-82 . 
64r bid . , Appendix, 563. 
65rbid . On September S, 1917, Hull was instrumental in defeating 
an amendmeiit"proposed by Representative Charles H .  Sloan of Nebraska ask­
ing for a thirty-year limit on additional bonds thereafter issued to 
allied governments . Hull injected the view that the United States should 
not adopt an "ironclad statute" but should . consider some of "their con­
ditions and their wishes in regard to terms of maturity . "  He felt the 
allied governments would be overburdened by their own domestic indebted­
ness without taking. into account foreign indebtedness . I bid., 6640-6650. 
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as possible without the tax levies be ing "unduly burdensome or oppres­
sive. " Hull believed that most of the bonds issued for domestic purposes 
should be made optional or redeemable within approxi mately a five-year 
period. He reasoned that following the completion of the war a fixed 
66 
rate of interest could then be applied to the total aggregate debt. 
Cordell Hull, too, expressed a dislike of the sinking-fund method, 
even though the law would carry very definite provisions as to payme nt 
in the future. He affirmed that often the sinking-fund method, due to 
its partial setti�g aside of money, resulted in detainment or deferment 
of indebtedness. He also contended that as a part of the serial bond 
plan, it would be feasible to increase the estate tax rates so as to pro­
duce $200,000,000 which would be equivalent to one serial bond payment . 
This view Hull had expressed in previous sessions of Congress.67 
I n  addition, Hull emphasized that he did not favor the establish� 
ment of tax exemptio�s for the bonds . Taking account of the great amount 
of federal, state, county, and municipality bonded indebtedness and the 
property belonging to charitable and other institutions exempt from taxa­
tion, he declared :  
I have for some time been of opinion that in  amassing the 
great war debt which the Government is be ing compelied to incur , 
the right of the Government to tax the interest on this debt , 
either now or following the war , should not be surrendered . At 
the best , the amount of the world ' s  capital which will be found 
to be exempt from taxation at the close of the war will be appal­
l ing . With the right to tax reserved , the cause of a bonded 
aristocracy can be avoided and the interest advantages accruing 
to the bondholders · can always be kept on a l eve l justly  propor­
tionate to interest advantages derived from other sources .  Few 
661 bid . ,  Appendix , 563 . 
greater evils could arise than the entire tax exemption of our 
public debt growing out of the war , especially if a period of 
depression and hard times should follow the reconstruction 
period , which would represent a situation in which would be 
found one class of idle and wealthy bondholders owing no finan­
cial obligations to the Federal , State , or local governments , 
and another class composed of the masses subject in their priva­
tions to the enormous taxes to pay both the interest and the 
principal of such bonds and other expenses of the Governme nt . 
Such condition would greatly conduce to socialism . 68 
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Hull stated that if the pending_ revenue bill were passed ,  the 
third liberty loan , although the interest would be free from state and 
local taxes , it would be subject to the identical supe r  income , estate , 
and excess-profits taxes as were levied on the second liberty loan . He 
opposed the tax- free bond policy , pointing out it had caused economic 
distress in those countries such as Italy , Canada , France , and New Zea­
land , which had used it. The offer of the third liberty loan at four 
and one-half per cent interest , he declared , "presents to the people the 
best , soundest , and most desirable investment to be found in the world 
today . "69 
Before the House on February 2 6 , 1919 , Hull wholeheartedly sup­
ported the final bond issue , the proposed victory loan bill. In a moment 
of pride characteristic of the nation ' s  spirit of that time , and remind• 
. ing the nation's citizens of their financial obligations , Hull declared :  
Turning again to our own financial and economic situation , we 
experience a feeling of great relief af ter dwelling on the dark 
picture presented by the other belligerent countries. Our popu­
lation. is more than 100 , 000 , 000 and our wealth more than 
$250 , 000 , 000 , 000 , while our annual savings must be more than 
681 bid . , 56 6 . 
69� . , 2 sess . , Appendix , 2 69-27 1. 
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$ 15, 000, 000, 000. The Nation can without difficulty meet and ·pay 
off its obligations far in advance of other nations. The Nation 
can and should maintain and strengthen its unparalleled position 
of world supremacy industrially, financially, and commercially. 
The United States has to its credit a 19 months' war record which 
is the admiration of the world, as it is the despair of the enemy. 
Let us keep in mind at least some of the big things the Nation has 
accomplished, some of the big achievements with which it has 
startled the world. The courage and patriotism of our soldiers 
and sailors have brought lasting honor and glory to the Nation . 
Let us without brooding over little things, cheerfully practice 
enough financial heroism to pay the necessary taxes involved. 70 
Hull emerged from World War I as a recognized leader who had con­
tributed a great deal to his nation ' s  war efforts. His demonstration of .. 
expert financial leadership proved him to be of considerable value to 
the Wilson administration. However, with regard to his own career, the 
most important single result was his conviction that ' economic wars were 
but the germs of real wars. " Hull determined to offer more assistance 
to the nation in arriving at a solution to the tariff question. On 
November 11, 19 18, Armistice Day, President Wilson wrote F. w .  Taus sig, 
Chairman of the Tariff Commission: 
The Hon . Cordell Hull, of Tennessee, a very serious student 
of public affairs and a very admirable man whom I am glad to 
call my friend, intends, I know, to seek an intervie� with you 
about tariff legislation, and I am taking the liberty of writing 
you this line to tell you he is worthwhile. 7 1  
Having gained status as a ranking Democrat member of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, and the war having been won, prospects for the future 
could only seem bright indeed. The disheartening result to Hull and other 
Democrats was that the Wilson administration suffered a disastrous political 
7 0
.!_b1.
· d . , 3 4340 s e a s . , 
7 1  Baker, ££ · cit. , VIII, 590. 
defeat. In  the mid-tenn elections of 1918 , the Republicans captured 
control of both houses of Congress. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEMOCRATIC DISSENTER IN REPUBLICAN OJNGRESSES 
The election of the Sixty- sixth Congress,  which began on May 19, 
1919, with both houses predominantly Republican , was the first of six 
consecutive Republican Congresses. In this Congress Hull served for two 
years, which was during the remaining duration of the Wilson Administra­
tion . Suffering his only political defeat at the polls in a bid for a 
seat in the succeeding Congress,  he nevertheless  served his party ably 
as chairman of the Democratic National Committee. After being reelected 
to the Sixty-eighth Congress, he served continuously through the Seventy­
first Congress,  when he was elected to the United States Senate for a 
six-year term beginning March 4, 1931. 
It can be well said that the years between 1919 and 1931, for the . 
most part, were largely uneventful years for the Democratic Party. Hull, 
along with other Democrats, for twelve years suffered the consequences 
of a Republican-dominated executive as well as legislative branch of the 
government. Although Hull--the dissenter--continued to voice his opinion 
concerning the vital is sues of the day, his voice was seldom noticed. 
The years marked those in which Hull expressed his ideas concerning issues 
involving post-war problems and assumed more responsibility and leadership 
as a member of the Democratic Party . He also increased and voiced his 
knowledge of the financial operations of the government , and asserted 
61 
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his definite beliefs concerning the prevailing tariff issue which finally 
culminated in his election to the Senate. 
Other leaders of the same party as Hull's who served during that 
"slumbering period" for the Democrats were Tom Connally, John Garner, 
and Sam Rayburn of  Texas ;·Alben Barkley of  Kentucky ; Henry Rainey of 
Illinois ; and Joseph Byrns and Finis Garrett of Tennessee. Tom Connally 
recorded in his autobiography that Hull "didn't fraternize much with other 
members . "  Connally continued: 
He was a man who rarely made a speech . He stayed in his office 
a great deal of the time doing research and gathering data and 
statistics, and we looked upon him as a student. He wrote many 
speeches on the subject of low tariffs, but he put them into the 
Record without delivering them on the floor .  He wasn't especially 
shy ; he just wanted to avoid rough and tumble debates . l 
Hull, focusing the attention of the House on less serious matters 
of the day, on May 24, 1919, proudly informe� the body of the presence of 
Sergeant Alvin C. York.2 Sergeant York, who was awarded the United 
States Medal of Honor for his outstanding bravery during World War I, 
made his home in Hull's congressional district . Hull excl�imed: 
Mr . Chairman, I desire to call the attention of the House to 
the fact that there now sits in the gallery a young man who has 
been recognized by all the commanding generals of the Army as 
having accomplished the greated individual feat of the recent 
Wo rld War, Sergt. Alvin C. York, of Company G, Three Hundred and 
1cong . � · ,  66 Cong . ,  1 seas., 191 . 
2Tom Connally as told to Alfred Steinberg . � � is Tom 
Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954), 110-111 . 
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Twenty-eighth Regiment, Eighty-second Division. [Applause ] 3 
Hull was outspoken in his opinions concerning the post-war problems 
encountered by the United States in its relationships with other countries 
of the world. On April 9, 1920, he expressed his opposition to the House 
Joint Resolution4 "terminating the state of war. declared to e xist April 6 ,  
1917, between the Imperial German Government and the United States." The 
resolution was based mainly on condition that reciprocal trade relations 
be resumed . 5 He strongly defended President Wilson ' s  efforts to negoti­
ate a lasting treaty at Versailles, and with equal vehemence condemned 
the Senate for its failure to approve its ratification . After ten months 
of delay, Hull, referring to the joint resolution, reluctantly stated 
that the House "by means of a purely legislative measure, " was compelled 
to use the most necessary and "important part of the treaty-making power 
of the Government . " 6 He asserted that the Constitution had given the 
President the authority "generally to negotiate commercial treaties." 
The duty of Congress, he contended, was to legislate in the form of levies, 
collections, and regulations to carry out the commercial treaties . 
3I bid . ,  199 . On August 20, 1919, Hull unsuccessfully introduced 
a bill "authorizing. the President to appoint Alvin Collum York a second 
lieutenant and place his name on the retired list with the pay and the 
allowances of a second lieutenant of the Regular Army . The bill was re­
ferred to the Committee on Military Affairs . I bid . ,  4085 . In  future 
sessions of Congress, Hull also, without succe�introduced similar bills 
authorizing the President to make York a captain. I bid . ,  69 Cong . ,  1 
sess . ,  2480 , -
41 bid . ,  6 6  Cong . ,  2 sess . ,  54 11-5412. 
5� . ,  Index, 9776 . 
61 bid . ,  5411-5412. 
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Hull indicated that section three of the bill 0ostensibly and 
prtendedly" proposed to establish reciprocal trade relations with Germany . 
The real purpose of the section, Hull concluded, after he had made a 
fair evaluation, was to have the .German government agree to confirm to 
the United States and its protectorates the "benefits and advantage s "  
which the President and allied countries had forced the German govern­
ment to accept in the Treaty of Versailles. He held that the resolution 
would place the United States in a most unjustifiable position. Hull 
raised the question as to how the United States after it had rejected 
the Versailles Treaty, signed by Germany and each of the allied nations, 
could now insist that the German government conform only to the parts of 
the treaty that benefited the United States? The use of the words, 
United States, he said, "would become a hiss and byword in every civil­
ized country on earth .. , ,7 The resolution was passed by both Houses of 
Congress, but was vetoed by the President . .  The effort of the House to 
override the President ' s  veto failed because of the lack of the neces-
h .  d . . 8 sary two-t ir s maJority . It was brought again and passed after Harding 
became President . 9 
In 1920 Hull, taken under by the Harding landslide along with 
many other Democrats, was defeated in his bid for a seat in the Sixty­
seventh Congress . It was the only political defeat suffered by Hull at 
the polls. The loss was caused mostly by the "lukewarmness" of many 
71 bid. 8Ibid . ,  Index, 9776 . 
9t bid., 67 Cong . ,  1 sess., Index, 399 . 
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Democrats toward the Wilson administration. Hull sought to arouse voter 
support within his Fourth Congressional District, but nevertheless many 
. h . h 10 Democrats were content wit staying at ome. Women, .exercising their 
suffrage right for the first time in Tennessee, largely failed to support 
Hull. It is interesting that the previous year Hull had voted in Con­
gress against woman suffrage . 11 The result was that a Republican, Wayne 
Clouse, won by 390 votes. Two years later, while carrying nine of 
thirteen counties in his district, Hull defeated the incumbent Clouse by 
a majority of nearly 6, 000 votes. In previous years the normal Demo-
12 cratic majority had been 3, 500 votes. 
In November, 1921, Hull accepted the unsought and thankless posi­
tion of his party's chairmanship. Since the party had divided over the 
reelection of its chairman, George H. White, a backer of Governor Cox, 
Hull was chosen as an acceptable compromise candidate, much due to the 
support of Carter Glass . During the Democratic Convention of 1920, 
Hull had not closely allied himself with any of the candidates. 
13 
The 
� York Times, in commending the Democrats on their selection in an 
editorial, stated that Hull "has no part in the premature ambitions of 
any Democrats who are casting sheep's eyes at the White House." The 
10 Hull, 2E ·  .£!! · ,  I, 105- 106 . 
11� � � ' November 9, 1920. 
12Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 8, 1922. 
13New � � ' November 2, 1921. 
paper declared that the new chairman ' s  main task was to elect a Demo­
cratic House in 1922. 14 
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For a number of years Hull had been a member of the executive 
committee, and had become very familiar with the inner workings of the 
organization. For the next three years, the last one of which was served 
after he regained his seat in the House , the Chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee worked tirelessly and unceasingly for the good of his · 
party.15 Chairman Hull was in part responsible for the revitalizing of 
the party following the Harding landslide, as evidenced by the splendid 
Democratic showing in the election of 1922. 
While chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Hull was 
often called upon to express the party's viewpoints on prevailing issues 
of the period . In March, 192 1, he prepared an article entitled "Economic 
16 Consequences of the Defeat of the Peace Treaty . "  The defeat of the 
Treaty of Versailles, Hull believed, had delayed conditions of peace the 
world over for two years. He observed that the refusal of America, 
neutral countries, and other strong nations to cooperate economically 
with the states of central and eastern Europe had resulted in the "world 
cataclysm ."  He indicated that it was the "unbiased judgment of states­
men, economists, financiers, and business men"17 throughout the world 
14I bid., November 3, 192 1 .  
15Hull , � ·  cit . ,  I, 113- 115. 
16cong . � · ,  67 Cong . ,  1 sees., Appendix, 8844. 
17rbid . f 8847 I 
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that if the needful sections of Europe had been properly aided, the 
chaotic conditions of that time could have been avoided. Hull concluded: 
The most charitable comment that can be made on the conduct 
of these Republican leaders is that if they thus willfully and 
deliberately and knowingly wrecked the peace , the political, 
social, and economic order in many parts of the world, the act 
of so doing constitutes the blackest of all black crimes com­
mitted in the annals of the human race . 18 
In January, 1922, Chairman Hull was the guest of honor at a Jack­
son Day dinner given by the Tennessee Society . Attending were pro�inent 
Democrats such as Bernard Baruch and William G .  McAdoo. For the occa­
sion Hull chose his favorite subject--the need for the United States to 
call a world trade conference to help restore economically depleted 
nations. The speech and seemingly gala event received wide coverage by 
the New York Times. 19 
Among the most intricate problems before Congress during the 
twenties was the collection of loans which the United States had made 
to the Allies after 1917 and during their initial stage of reconstruc­
tion. The American government looked upon these loans as genuine--no 
different from the loan of one person to another--and expected them to 
be paid back. On the other hand, Europeans felt the United States had 
entered the war late ; her casualty list was slight ; much of the loans 
had been spent on United States goods ; and they believed the American 
government was prosperous enough to be able to forget the matter. Con­
gress was unwilling to oblige, and in 1922 formed the World War Foreign 
181 bid. 
19New � Times, January 6, 1922. 
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Debt Commission, which made agreements with fifteen Allied nations be-
tween 1923 and 192 6. 20 The settlements were arranged in accordance with 
capacity to pay; thus , Italy's interest rate was a meager 0 . 4  per cent , 
2 1  whereas , more prosperous England's rate was 3.3 per cent. 
Hull regained his seat in the Sixty-eighth Congress , and on 
January 14 , 1926 , he spoke in opposition before the Sixty-ninth Congress 
to the proposed bill for the settlement of the Italian debt.2 2  He and 
Henry Rainey of Illinois were the dissenting members of the Ways and 
Means Committee . 23 The Italian nation owed the United States government 
$ 2 , 042 , 000 , 000. The bill , as proposed before the House24 and enacted , 25 
extended the debt over a sixty-two year period ; provided for payment of 
interest and principal totaling $2 , 407 , 000 , 000 ; and declared for the 
first five years a nominal $5 , 000 , 000 installment on the principal and a 
moratorium on the discharge of interest.26 
Hull opposed the bill for the settlement of the Italian debt on 
the grounds that the 62-year payment plan , with an assumed interest rate 
of 4-1/4 per cent , 2 7 the current rate received by holders of United States 
20Freidel , �·  cit. , 236. 
2 1Hicks , et ,!! , , £2 ·  cit. , 449. 
2 2
�. ,  69 Cong. , 1 seas. , 2055. 
23N'ew � � , January 7 ,  1926. 
24 Cong . �. , 69 Cong. , 1 seas. , 2066. 
25I bid. , Index , 714. 2 6I bid. , 7902-7903. 
2 7�. , 2057. 
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war bonds , 28 would amount to a total debt of more than $ 5, 500,000,000 . 
By subtracting $ 2, 407, 000, 000, the proposed amount for I taly to pay, from 
the "true" debt of $5 , 500 , 000, 000, Hull emphasized that the United States 
taxpayers would actually pay a sum of $ 3, 093, 000,000 of the total debt . 
This, he observed , namounts to $7, 000, 000 for each of the 435 congres­
sional districts of the United States. "29 He also noted that if Italy 
were to pay portions of the $2, 407, 000, 000 settlement, as proposed, less 
than one-fourth would be paid during the following thirty-one years . 
The rema inder, Hull exclaimed, would be "transferred to that nebulous, 
faraway period of time which embr·aces the next generation, " a period 
over which men of today do not have full contro1 . 30 
Hull stated that when the bill was before the House Ways and 
Means Committee, he had advocated as an alternative giving I taly a mora­
torium on payment of both interest and principal for six years , reducing 
the debt some 50 to 60 per cent of the aggr·egate, and then letting the 
two governments reach a satisfactory agreement as to payment of interest 
and principal. He contended that the United Stat.es, by the continuation 
of the moratorium for s ix years , could save over half or $ 2,000, 000, 000 
of the Italian debt, with interest included at 4-1/4 per cent. Hull be­
lieved the per iod of moratorium would enable the United States to be in 
a better position to gauge more accurately Italy ' s ability to pay . 31 
28I bid . ,  7894 . 
30 I bid . , 2 0 5 8 . 
291 bid . , 2057-2058 . 
31  I bid . , 2060. 
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Hull, too, on available statistical evidence, assumed that during 
the six-year period , I taly v s business would prosper and her wealth would 
increase . Therefore, he thought I taly's capacity to refund the debt 
32 would be enlarged . He also injected the idea of the need for a favor� 
able balance of trade . He asserted that I taly's external debt would 
never be paid as long as an unfavorable balance of trade existed . This 
unfavorable balance, he felt, was caused by the high protective tariffs 
3 3  
which had been recently enacted by the United States .  
Obviously, the war resulted in a great deal of confiscated prop­
erty by both the United States and its enemies--Gennany, Austria, and 
Hungary. Following the war, negotiations were held to make an agreeable 
settlement for the lost property . On December 16, 192 6,Hull spoke in 
the House concerning a bill for the settlement of property between 
American nationals34 and German nationals . 35 His speech said little 
321 bid . , 2062 . 331 bid . ,  2060-2061 . 
34The term national, strictly defined, re fers to a person who 
owes allegiance to a country but is not a citizen of that country . 
American nationals are given most of the protections which citizens 
have, "and the actual distinction is hazy . "  When Congress legislates 
"the status of nationals to people it identifies them as belonging to 
and entitled to the protection of the United States, particularly for 
the purpose of international relations . "  Jack C. Plano and Milton 
Greenberg, � American Political Dictionary (New York : Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc. , 1962 ) ,  49-50 . 
35The term, German national, as used in the proposed bill, re­
ferred to "an individual who, on April 6, 1917 , was a citizen or sub­
ject of Germany, or who, on the date of the enactment of this act, is 
a citizen or subject of Germany . "  Cong . �· , 69 Cong . ,  2 sess., 594 . 
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specifically about the proposed bill,36 but was mostly concerned with an 
indictment of the past and present Republican administrations for their 
methods of handling the German financial indebtedness to the United States . 
In the procurement of "army occupation costs , and claims of their respec­
tive nationals," Hull sought to prove that from the beginning, 1919, the 
American government held "aloof and isolatedu 3 7 as compared to coopera­
tion and unity on the part of the allied nations. 
Hull retold how the United States had failed to ratify the Ver­
sailles treaty of peace signed by the allied nations with Germany in 
1919, and in 1921, acting separately, had negotiated a treaty of peace 
with Germany. This separate treaty, the Berlin treaty of ' 1921, included 
each of the terms concerning army occupation costs and claims of Ameri­
can nationals as accepted by the allied nations in the Treaty of Ver­
sailles. Thus, the United States sought to deal directly with the German 
government, whereas, the allied nations worked together and received 
through the Reparations Commission the major share of their army occupa­
tion costs. Hull declared that the United States received nothing in 
the form of reparations, due to failure to "request or accept payment" 
through both the Reparations Commission and the provisions of the Berlin 
treaty . 38 He also stated that the allied governments, acting under 
36The basic plan of the proposed bill was that 80 per cent of 
the total value of property, including interest, both of American and 
German claimants, would be returned in the form of money. The remain­
ing 20 per cent, with interest, would be set aside in a deferred class 
and would share a percentage of the payments of the Dawes plan. I bid . , 
602 . 
3 71 bid., 605 .  381 bid . 
72 
specific articles of the Versailles treaty, between 1919 and 1925 estab­
lished clearing offices for the settlement of the claims of nationals on 
both sides of the war. He observed that during the more than five years 
of operation, the clearing offices settled the majority of the claims; 
whereas, the United States having declined to use either the clearing 
office operation under the Versailles treaty or the Berlin treaty natu­
rally received nothing.39 
Hull, during the same speech, told of the reluctance of the United 
States government to allow complete cooperation of the nation's repre­
sentatives to the various conferences for the arrangement of repara­
tions payments. He referred to the fact that the separate treaty of 
peace with Germany, the Berlin treaty, carried a Senate reservation not 
allowing the representation of the United States on the Reparations Com­
mission without the approval of Congress. He noted that the American 
delegates who attended the London reparations conference in July, 192 4, 
to consider the Dawes report for reparations payments were very limited 
in their scope to act, and for fear of "involvement" refused to sign 
the f inal act.40 
Continuing, Hull recalled that a conference was held in Paris 
in January, 1925, for the purpose of agreeing to the distribution of 
portions of the German reparations to the allied nations, and that , as 
the conference approached, the United States was divided between a desire 
39Ibid. 40t bid. 
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to secure part of the reparations payments and the same fear of  "involve­
ment. " At this point, Hull said, our nation took a closer look at the 
Dawes plan as adopted by the London conference. The act provided that 
payments from Germany could be received only from reparations payments 
provided for by the Dawes Commission. Thus, the United States was blocked 
from receiving any payments direct from Germany under the Berlin treaty. 
It  was under these conditions, Hull contended, that the American govern­
ment quickly acted to secure permission for its representatives to act 
as official delegates to the Paris conference. 41 
"As the only way out of a bad situation," and because it . was not 
the fault of the claimants, Hull declared he would vote for the pending 
bill. He said, "I shall never be able to excuse the stupidity and out­
rageous negligence of our Government in handling its claims and the 
claims of nationals . 1 142 The bill passed the House with Hull voting for 
it. Although the bill was debated before the Senate, it was never voted 
upon. 43 During the following session of Congress, a similar bill in­
cluding the nations of Austria and Hungary, as well as Germany, was suc­
cessfully enacted into law. 44 Hull played no part in that bill. 
During those Republican congressional years , Hull continued to 
voice his opinions concerning the financial operations of the govern­
ment. On May 31, 1919, within the immediate postwar era, Hull made a 
41Ibid . 
43t bid. , I ndex , 309. 
42 
441 bid . ,  70 Cong. , 1 sess. , Index , 684. 
I bid., 607. 
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speech in support45 of an attempted repeal of the luxury tax4 6  which had 
been recently extended .47 Before he stated his reason for advocating 
the repeal of the tax measure, he made a lively attack aimed mostly upon 
· 
f P 1 . 
48 
h b f Representative J .  Hampton Moore o ennsy vania, w o moments e ore 
had delivered an address before the House . Hull asserted : 
I must say that I get a little weary when some gentlemen 
persist in interrupting the real business of the House by 
attempting to play what some people would say was cheap poli­
tics--raising the question of politics in every conceivable 
little way--was this a Democratic bill, was it introduced by 
a Republican or a Democrat? My God ! We have more problems 
to solve than our entire joint wisdom can possibly solve, and 
I say ·it is discouraging, when many of us on both sides have 
been earnestly striving jointly to work out some of these prob­
lems, to be constantly interrupted by gentlemen whose chief 
mission seems to be to play politics . In my opinion, unless 
some of that is suppressed during the next 18 months , the 
country will not be subjected to any greater menance from the 
I .  W. W .  and the anarchists than it will from the professional 
politicians. [Applause on the Democratic side J 49 
In his denunciation of the luxury tax, Hull claimed that the 
method was impractical due to its many administrative complexities .  He 
indicated that the measure required the burdensome and unnecessary in­
volvement of millions of clerks and salesmen in the application of the 
various rates on the many articles subject to the tax. He also believed 
another method of taxation, less expensive, should be devised for the 
1 1 f d .  
so uxury c ass o expen itures. 
45I bid . , 66 Cong . ,  1 seas .  , 
46I bid . ,  I ndex, 9722 . 
48I bid. , Index, 9235 . 
50i bid . 
483-485 . 
471 bid. 485 . 
49I bid . ,  484 .  
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I n  a highly partisan speech before the House, Hull, on May 25, 
1920, bitterly criticized the Republican Party for its fiscal policies. 
He sought to prove by statistical evidence that the Democratic Party 
had always practiced economy, whereas the Republican Party had been 
traditionally the party of extravagance. He contended that a Democratic 
Congress could be "expected and relied upon to bring about speedy, com­
prehensive, and equitable reforms in the present system of war taxa­
tion." He thus concluded that only a Democratic Congress could develop 
a suitable and effective program of peace-time taxation . 5 1  
I n  the meantime , Hull was defeated for reelection to the House 
and became chairman of the Democratic National Conunittee . In this pos i­
tion, he wisely continued to use his vast amount of financial knowledge. 
His first public statement was that the party "will pay debts promptly. "52 
The financial leader had become the party ' s  chairman when its treasury 
was near bankruptcy--an accumulated $ 300, 000 of debts . 5 3  During this 
time only a few men such as Bernard M. Baruch, William Jennings Bryan, 
and Thomas L. Chadbourne , New York lawyer, gave generous financial 
assistance to the party. Baruch described the financial dilemma that 
the "competent and conscientious" Hull faced by a letter written from 
Hull to him on November 12 , 1923: 
5 1I bid., 2 sess . ,  7613. 
52New York Times, November 3, 1921 . 
511u11, ££· cit . ,  I ,  116 . 
I am still writing my own checks for more or less substantial 
amounts every week in order to squeeze by the weekend . This, of 
course , has crucified me in my efforts to do the real things that 
I should have been doing on as nearly a hundred per cent basis as 
possible during past months . I shall continue to hold on with a 
death grasp, however , and do the maximum amount of work possible 
on a shoestring . 54 
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Following much hard work, upon his resignation , Hull could boast of a 
surplus of $30,000 . Thus , Hull took over the chairmanship of the party 
at its lowest ebb , both politically and financially , and along w ith 
d. d . d ' ' b '  h 55 othe r de icate Democrats greatly assiste in its re irt . 
While chairman of the Democratic Party, Hull on many occasions 
voiced the party ' s  viewpoint concerning the financial conditions of the 
nation. In  � eptember, 1923 , The Congressional Digest published an 
article written by Hull entitled "The Democrats Challenge the Republican 
Tax Record." I n  an obviously partisan article, he contended that the 
Democrats by February, 1919, had reduced war taxes $2,000,000,000 below 
those of the previous year . The Democratic leader concluded that the 
Harding administration, now in its third year, had only made reductions 
of $850,000,000. Hull stated that the major part of this sum was the 
result of tax reductions on the wealthy class. 5 6  
Upon returning to the Sixty-eighth Congress, Hull, on February 7, 
192 5 , made the longest speech of his career in the House of Represents-
54Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York: Holt , Rinehart and 
Winston, I nc., 1950), 175-.-
55Hull, � ·  cit. , I,  113-116. 
56cordell Hull , "The Democrats Challenge the Republican Tax Record 1 " 
The Congressional Digest, I I  (September, 1923), 353. 
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tives. Although his address was slanted, needles to say, towards the 
Democratic viewpoint, the speech was a penetrating analysis of the 
government's fiscal policies between 1913 and 1925. The address, mostly 
pertaining to fiscal measures during World War I ,  covered thirteen pages 
in the Congressional Record . 5 7 Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, 58 who 
was Secretary of the Treasury under President Wilson and who was a close 
59 personal friend of Hull, told the Tennessee Congressman that he re-
mained awake all night reading and studying the speech. 60 
During the address, Hull called attention to the tax reduction 
claims made by the opposing political party. He made specific reference 
to President Coolidge's remark that the American citizens' taxes had 
been substantially reduced by nearly $ 2, 000, 000, 000 in each of the last 
four years. Hull asserted that "some careless subordinate has greatly 
misled the President. " He believed that in actuality the tax reductions 
had amounted to nothing since large amounts of taxes had only "been 
shifted but not reduced . "  Hull indicated that internal taxes were re­
duced while at the same time higher tariff taxes were legislated which 
imposed a comparable levy. 61 
On December 9, 1925, Hull entered the House debate on the general 
revenue bill for the fiscal year 1926 . In a lengthy discussion on 
57 Cong . � - ,  68 Cong . ,  2 seas . ,  3249- 3262 .  
58t bid , ,  Index, 3. 59Hul l, � ·  � . ,  I,  72 , 
60� . ,  124 .  
61  Cong , !!£ · ,  68 Cong . ,  2 see s . ,  3260 .  
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taxation, he urged that the existing maximum estate tax should remain at 
25 per cent ; the maximum income surtax at 25 per cent ; the exemption for 
married persons should be lowered from $3, 500 to $ 2, 500 and include an 
exemption of $400 for each dependent ; a tax of 2 to 3 per cent on the 
undistributed profits of corporations, but never greater than 3 per cent ; 
reduction of taxes to the extent of $350, 000, 000 ; and the repeal of the 
wartime automobile and admission taxes. 62 He supported the proposed 
revenue bill, 63 which became law on February 26, 1926 . The Revenue Act 
of 1926 provided for a maximum estate tax and income surtax of 20 per 
cent ; an exemption for married persons of $3, 500 with a credit of $400 
for each dependent ; no tax on undistributed profits of corporations ; re­
duction of taxes to nearly $400, 000, 000 ; the lowering of automobile 
excise taxes from 5 to 3 per cent ; and the decreasing of the admission 
taxes from 10 per cent on admissions over 50 cents to 10 per cent on 
64 admissions over 75 cents. 
Hull, in the same speech, in regard to past inefficient methods 
of taxation, advocated greater cooperation among the federal, state, and 
local governments. He insisted that definite lines of division for 
62r bid. , 69 Cong. , 1 sess. , 565. Hull believed that by the con­
tinuance ofthe maximum surtax and estate tax, the $ 1, 500 exemption for 
single persons, and the $3, 500 exemption for married couples with the $500 
credit for each dependent, the automobile and admission taxes would not 
be needed . I bid . Hull, too , expressed his opinion that married couples 
without dependents should be "lightly taxed ." He believed that the amount 
of the exemption on a graduated income tax structure should be established 
near the "minimum subsistence" level . I bid. , 882 . 
631 bid. , 1164- 1165 . 
64r bid. , 70 Cong . ,  1 sess . ,  10811- 10817. 
jurisdictional purposes should be established so as to promote the 
greatest utilization of tax resources . 65 He outlined the following 
program: 
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1 .  The federal government which needed $3 � 000 , 000 , 000 for the 
current fiscal year should make the income tax its chief revenue 
producing method . Customs , tobacco , estate taxes not needed by 
the states , oleomargerine , alcohol , and when totally necessary a 
limited system of stamp taxes should be applied as additional 
sources . 
2 .  The states should use the inheritance tax to the fullest 
possible degree . Revenue derived from gasoline , license , and 
other automobile taxes should approximate $300 , 000 , 000 . A flat 
tax levy of 1 to 2 per cent should be applied on one's personal 
income , thereby taxing both the "intangible and tangible property 
holder . "  States should also use special assessment measures , 
license , occupation , and othe r minor taxes .  
3 .  The municipalities should secur e their main income from 
real estate taxes in addition to special assessments , fees , 
sales , license , and other minor business taxes . 66 
On December 10 , 1927 , Hull again asserted that the Republicans 
had levied more taxes than the Democrats . Speaking before the House , 
he proudly noted that it was a Democratic Congress in February , 1919 , 
which reduced internal taxes from the wartime high of $6 , 000 , 000 , 000 
to $4 , 000 , 000 , 000 . He observed that the "so-called tax reduction acts 
of 192 1 ,  1924 , and 1926" had decreased tax levies by an e stimated sum 
of $1 , 604 , 000 , 000 . The significant point made by Hull was that during 
the same time the Harding and Coolidge administrations had increased the 
tariff rates to yield an additional $3 , 000 , 000 , 000 to $4 , 000 , 000 , 000. 
He also pointed out that the federal expenditures between 1922 and 192 8 
65r bid . , 69 Cong . , 1 sess . , 564-565 . 
66I bid . , 565 . 
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had been reduced by only $ 169,000, 000 . 67 
Hull, too, chose to criticize the great amount of popular talk 
concerning "Coolidge economy" and the accomplishments of Andrew Mellon, 
Secretary of the Treasury. While recalling that Coolidge became Presi­
dent in August, 1923, Hull stated that federal expenditures for the fis­
cal year ending June 30, 1924, were $3, 506,000, 000 . He then observed 
that the estimated expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1928 , 
were $3, 626,000, 000, or an increase of $ 120, 000, 000. "Further comment, " 
Hull declared , "is unnecessary. 1 1 68 As for Secretary of the Treasury, 
Andr.ew Mellon, Hull felt that he was far from worthy of the Republicans' 
praise, which would make him of comparable stature to Alexander Hamilton. 
"The honest truth , "  Hull maintained, was that the problems encountered 
by Mellon since 1921 had been "simple and easy" in regard to the condi­
tions which he had inherited. 69 Thus, Hull believed that the Democrats 
had paved the way for Mellon ' s  success. 
In the same speech, Hull further stated that the interest rate on 
the war debt had been much higher during the years of Republican admin­
istration than during the Democratic years. The Wilson administration , 
he pointed· out, had stabilized the long-term war debt on a maximum 
support level of 4- 1/4 per cent interest rate . Hull as serted that the 
4� 1/4 per cent ceiling was fixed even though outspoken representatives 
67!lli · ,  70 Cong. , 1 sess. , 433-434. 
68 69 !ill• , 434 . I bid. , 435 . 
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of financial institutions had pressed for a rate as high as 4½ per cent . 
Thus , he declared that the nation v s  taxpayers were saved billions of 
dollars. He stated that millions of dollars were lost when the Harding 
and Coolidge administrations allowed the banks to establish the interest 
rates of government securities. He further stated that the greatest 
amount of interest paid was not obtained until the fiscal year 1923, 
four years after the war, when the Harding administration paid 
$ 1, 056, 000, 000 interest, as compared with $ 1, 020, 000, 000 for 1920 under 
President Wilson . Hull then presented statistical evidence showing that 
the highest rates of interest on the public debt, following the war , had 
d . b ' f d . . . 70 occurre during Repu lican years o a ministration . He condemned the 
Republican Party for being unable to scale the interest rate below 4 per 
cent in 1927, eight years after the war.71 
Four days later, before the same body, turning his attention to 
the federal inheritance tax, Hull greatly criticized those who would 
relinquish the tax on the grounds of state rights , Hull avowed that 
he he ld in high regard those who honestly championed state rights , but 
questioned those individuals who would use the theory as a protection 
for the unjustifiable avoidance of tax payment . "State rights, " Hull 
upheld, "does [siq] not mean the exemption of weal th from its fair share 
of taxes. "72 He repeated the argument he had used while advocating the 
701 bid . , 434-435 . The average rates of interest between the fis ­
cal yearsof1919 and 1927 were a s  fol lows : 19 19, 4 . 10 per  cent ; 1921, 
4 . 29 ·pe r cent ; 1922, 4 . 29 per cent ; 1923, 4 . 22 per cent ; 1924 , 4 . 2 1 pe r 
cent ; 1925, 4 . 14 per cent ; 1926, 4. 09 per  cent ; and 1927 , 3 . 9 6 per cent . 
!ill · , 435. 
71I bid . 12!,lli. , 636 .  
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passage of the first federal inheritance tax in 1916 that within eight 
months after the state of New York had increased its inheritance tax 
rates only a small amount, $400,000, 000 was .transferred into states with 
lower rates. Thus, Hull concluded, an obvious peculiarity of many of 
those of substantial wealth was a "roving disposition" or "migratory 
habits. 1 1 73 
The greater portion of Hull's speeches in Congress during his 
tenure between 1919 and 1931 were connected with the tariff issue. 
During this period the Republicans backed mostly by large business in­
terests made successive efforts to raise the tariff to protect American 
industry and supposedly protect the agriculture economy . Several tariffs , 
decidedly upward, were passed . Time and agai� before the House, Hull 
directed a steady stream of attack upon the Republicans for their advo­
cacy of higher tariffs. His first criticism came on December 9, 1919, 
when he opposed the passage of an antidumping bill. 74 The bill, which 
failed to pass, was presented by its many supporters as a means of pro­
tecting the American manufacturers and their wage earners from the effects 
of depreciated currencies abroad·. Hull felt differently; he believed 
the country would be unable to increase domestic production and expand 
foreign trade if the United States chose to erect artificial barriers . 
He declared: 
Prices are high in the United States, and the enactment of a 
comprehensive, inflexible antidumping law such as is now proposed 
73I bid. 
74I bid. , 66 Cong. , 2 sess. , Index, 9720. 
will have a tendency to sustain and increase rather than de­
crease existing high prices . This is no time to stimulate or 
increase prices to the American consumers and to the American 
manufact�rers as to raw materials and semimanufactured products 
when they are already artificially high, when ours is the only 
country that has surpluses in important lines, and when the 
world not only has nothing to dump upon us but nothing to sell 
to us except, in the main, raw materials, products for further 
use in manufacturing, and noncompetitive articles . . . . In 
this period of high prices at home we can, to a real advantage 
rather than to any detriment, buy virtually anything the world 
has to sell and at such prices as may be offered . We want to 
lower prices rather than raise prices at present.75 
83 
Once again, on December 22, 1920, Hull spoke against increasing 
the tariff . On that occasion it was in opposition to a bill calling 
for an emergency tariff to impose duties on specific agricultural 
products. Following World War I, the prices of many farm products 
had decreased, when the abnormal wartime market came to an end, and a 
number of congressmen believed tariff protection was the. remedy . Hull 
stated that the United States was now exporting $ 8 , 000, 000 , 000, of 
which one-half was agricultural products, and the Department of Agricul­
ture anticipated a surplus in the future which must be sold abroad . 
Thus, Hull questioned the belief that increased tariff barriers would 
solve the problem of increased surpluses that could only be sold out­
side the United States . 76 
Hull pointed out the need for European nations to function eco­
nomically in a normal manner, which could be accomplished only by recip­
rocal cooperation between the United States and the countries of Europe. 
751 bid. , Appendix, 8743. 
76Ibid . ,  3 sess . ,  632. 
84 
For at that time most of the European nations had witnessed a loss of 
some 30 to 40 per cent of their productive power. He reasoned that for 
the European nations to re turn to an appropriate level of economic 
activity would require our nation to make available its surplus foods 
and raw materials at reasonable prices of exchange. He stressed that 
our country must buy from fore ign nations in order to supply them the 
necessary credits to purchase United States products . By the establish­
ment of this policy, Hull believed that normal international trade could 
be resumed.77 
Continuing in the same speech, Hull emphasized the special sig­
nificance of the proposed tariff, and declared :  
In  the language of President William McKinley, the period of 
exclusiveness is past . The expansion of our trade and commerce 
is the pressing problem . Notwithstanding every true sign and 
wise warning to the contrary, the fight for reaction, for ex­
clusiveness, and for economic isolation is now on . The sudden 
appearance of this hastily constructed high tariff bill was the 
signal for all the forces of stand-pat protection and of greed 
and selfishness to rally in a grand effort to ge t both the ir arms 
and their fee t  into the Federal Treasury. The logrollers behind 
this and other like high-tariff bills make the pork barrel log­
rollers drop their heads in shame . No person or business can 
become a beneficiary of one of these general high protective 
tariff l aws without joining with other beneficiaries, no matter 
how undeserving or extortionate, and upholding their demands . I 
am persuaded that the proponents of this measure, while recog­
niz ing its utter futility as a remedy for the present distress 
of the farmers, have rushed it  before Congress for the purpose 
of exciting the favorable interest and whe tting the appetite of 
certain wheat raisers and livestock growers, bean, peanut, onion, 
and other raisers of certain agriculture products, to the extent 
that they will next spring demand that the ir representatives here 
give their support not only to the protective- tariff items affect­
ing them at home but to the entire high protective tariff measure 
the reactionary Republicans expect to lay before Congress next 
year . 78 
7 7r bid . 78I bid . , 635 . 
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Hull also brought out the fact that a tariff does not fall alone 
on what one eats and wears, but encompasses all types of businesses which 
develop a raw material into a finished product. He pointed out that 
these added production costs of the manufacturers were passed onto the 
1 . 79 u timate consumer. Thus, in effect, . the ·enactment of a higher tariff 
would result in an upswing of price levels. He believed virtually all 
consumers of goods and services would be forced to share the higher price 
levels .  
The proposed emergency tariff bill was passed . by both Houses of 
Congress, 80 but was vetoed by President Wilson, whose veto message was 
read and sustained in the House on March 3 , 1921 . 8 1 President Wilson 
vetoed the bill on ground that it would not help the farmer, was designed 
only for selfish purposes, woul4 breed monopoly, and would cause many 
"to look upon the Government as an instrument for private gain instead 
of an instrument for the promotion of the general well being . 1182 
Hull was correct in stating that the protectionists would renew 
their efforts the following spring. President Harding, on May 27, 1921, 
less than three months after his inauguration, placed his signature on 
an emergency tariff bi118 3  passed by a special session of Congress . 84 
79I bid. , 637. 
8 1I bid. , 4519. 
8 3I bid . ,  6 7  Cong. , 
84carman, et al . ' 
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The act greatly increased the tariff on agricultural products and carried 
antidumping legislation. 85 Midwestern congressmen of both parties, act­
ing as a bloc, were instrumental in obtaining the legislation. 86 The 
following year, in Sept�mber, 192 2,87 with the assistance of the farm 
bloc, the Emergency Tariff was superseded by the Fordney-McCumber Act. 88 
Both laws raised tariff rates to the highest levels yet known, and 
measurably insured American producers against effective foreign ·competi­
tion . 89 
Because of his defeat in November, 1920, Hull was not in Congress 
when those laws were passed. But that did not mean that he had to re­
main silent on the tariff issue. When the Fordney-McCumber Act was pend­
ing, Hull directed the Democratic opposition to the measure.90 After the 
bill had passed, the highly respected magazine, The �, in its November, 
1922, issue, included an article by Hull entitled ''Why a Democratic Con­
gress?" He concluded that due to the rais ing of the tariff, history 
would repeat itself . He stated : 
There are historical precedents for the election of a Demo­
cratic Congress this year, following the enactment of the infamous 
Fordney-McCumber profiteering tariff bill. The McKinley high pro­
tective tariff of 1890 cost the Republicans the House that year, 
85cong . � · ,  68 Cong . ,  2 sess. , 3261. 
86Freidel, £2 ·  cit . ,  257 . 
87cong . !!£ · ,  67 Cong . ,  2 sese. ,  13181. 
88Freidel, £2 ·  cit . ,  257 .  
89Hicks, !! al . , �· cit . ,  476-477. 
90Hull, ££· cit . ,  I ,  1 14. 
and the presidency two years later . The Payne-Aldrich high 
protective tariff of 1909 cost the Republicans the House in 
1910 and the presidency two years later. History is again 
repeating itself. 91 
History did not repeat itself , however , until an even higher 
87 
tariff was passed in 1930 . On February 2 2 , 1923 , Chairman Hull de­
livered an address in Topeka , Kansas , entitled "The Farmer and the 
Tariff." In this highly partisan speech Hull reviewed the speedy , con­
tinued decline of farm prices and presented statistical evidence to prove 
that it was due to the enactment of the Emergency Tariff Act , the Fordney­
McCumber Act , and the "unsound economic position" held by the Harding 
administration. Since that administration was accountable for far more 
failures than accomplishments, Hull insisted the only possibility of re­
lief for the . American people was the return of the Democratic Party to 
power. He held that the Democratic Party, as it had done before when in 
power, would establish a definite program of foreign and domestic policy 
and would govern "with vision, constructive ability , and aggressive 
leadership" necessary for a satisfactory solution of the problems facing 
the nation . 92 
Immediately before Hull returned to Congress, he wrote an article 
entitled "Protection Fallacies," which appeared in the January, 1924, 
91cordell Hull, "Why A Democratic Congress?" The �' LXVIII  
(November, 1922) , 989. 
92 Cong. � - , 67 Cong. , 4 sess., 4667-467 1. 
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issue of The Forum magazine. 93 Senator Adrieus A. Jones of New Mexico94 
believed the article would aid him in his attempt to reduce taxes by the 
lowering of tariff rates.95 It typified many of Hull's former and future 
tariff speeches, and contained his usual denunciations of the Republican 
Party for its past and present tariff failures. 9 6  
After Hull returned to Congress, he delivered on February 7, 
1 9 25, a major speech in which he reviewed the nation ' s  fiscal policies 
and operations between 1 9 13 and 1 925. He insisted that the increased 
tax burdens "due to the radical increases" of the tariff duties were 
greater than the amount saved from the lessening of internal revenue 
9 7  taxes through the revenue acts of 1 92 1  and 1 924. In  specific reference 
to the last two tariffs enacted by Republican administrations, he de­
clared : 
We are the chief source of international credit; we have vast 
and unrivaled systems of mass production; the most modernized 
machinery, and labor of the highest skill and intelligence in 
the .world. Shall we continue to improve our efficiency in manu­
facturing and general production, correspondingly lowering our 
cost levels, and proceed further to develop and expand our 
domestic and international finance, trade, and commerce in a 
natural way, or shall we turn away from this inviting picture 
and tempting opportunity and pursue the shortsighted and disas­
trous course of curtailing production in all lines to our 
domestic needs save such excesses as may be disposed of by the 
unthinkable process of dumping? The Fordney-McCumber tariff 
law is the signboard pointing in this latter direction. 98 
93cordell Hull , "Protection Fallacies, " The Forum , LXXI (January , 
1924) ,  46. 
94cong. � · , 68 Cong. , 1 sees. , Index 3. Jones obtained the 
unanimous consent of the Senate for the inclusion of speech in the Cong. 
Rec. 
95�. , 3947 . 
97I bid. , 2 sees. , 3249-3262. 
96�. ,  3947-3948. 
98�. ,  3262. 
Hull also commented that the American farmer had "undoubtedly 
learned his tariff lesson . "  He claimed that the farmer :  
. . .  now knows that as to his most important products he has 
never received any tariff advantages, while all the time he has 
been obliged to pay extortionate tariff prices for what he has 
89 
had to buy . He now knows that any industry or business in America 
which produces a substantial surplus which must be sold in world 
markets can not hope to receive any appreciable tariff benefits; 
that so called high protective tariffs have the effect of arti­
ficially increasing prices ,  except as just stated, which is the 
prime purpose of those demanding the same; that while the high 
tariff creates artificial temporary prosperity for certain indus­
tries, others languish or suffer depression ; that the high tariff 
by preventing other countries from paying for our surplus in part 
in goods thereby diminishes their purchasing power and lessens 
their ability to buy our surplus at the attractive prices fixed 
by the undisturbed law of supply and demand . Our foreign trade 
is more than $5, 0 0 0, 0 0 0, 0 0 0  less for 1924 than it was in 1920 . 99 
During the spring of 192 6, Hull opposed the enactment of the 
McNary-Haugen Bill favored by those farmers who had supported the enact-
f h . . . ff 10 0  ment o t e existing tari s.  The McNary-Haugen Bill was designed to 
establish a federal farm board to assist in the "orderly marketing, con­
trol, and disposition of the agricultural surpluses. 11 10 1 Upon receiving 
the surplus, the government would sell it at the world price . An equali­
zation fee, levied on the farmer, would be established for the difference 
between the domestic and world price. Thus the farmer would receive the 
fixed price minus the equalization fee . 102 
991 bid. 
lOOlbid. , 69 Cong . ,  1 sess . ,  91 0 1 . 
1011 bid . , I ndex, 793. 
102carman t 1 · t 490 , e � .  , op . .£.!_. , . 
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The measure was supported by Senator Tom Walsh and Bernard 
Baruch. Baruch believed the bill should be given a test on at least one 
commodity. Alongside Hull, although in the Senate, stood Senators Walter 
George, Georgia ; Joseph Robinson, Arkansas; and Pat Harrison, Mississippi . 
Baruch wrote that Hull embodied the "free trade sentiment" of most of the 
Southern Democrats when he said to him "that he could not support a bil l  
which relied on the tariff to help the farmer . "103 Hull, in the House, 
opposed the measure, as he felt that the proposed bill would not be work­
able , beneficial, or fair to the farmer. In regard to the fact that our 
country h�d only recently passed antidumping . legislation, he largely 
opposed the bill in view of the section calling for a permanent system 
of dumping . 104 By a vote of 212 nays to 167 yeas, the bill·was defeated 
in the House . 105 
It was during the first half of 1926, while Hull continued to at­
tack the tariff and the Republican Party, that the Review of Reviews 
carried an article describing the various leaders of the House, including 
Hull . The article was written by William Hard, a Washington writer for 
various periodicals, who depicted Hul l  in the fol lowing manner : 
Hull might now be chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, 
except that he missed out on one Congress in the course of his 
service of nine Congresses. He is an infinite (and an infinitely 
able) specialist on the tariff . He is deeply solemn but pro­
foundly amiable. With all his amiableness, he remains convinced, 
however, that sinister powers of horrible iniquity have dictated 
the Republican tariff policy of this country. He seems to hate 
no individual Republican . He simply, morally, and impersonally 
103Baruch, �- cit . ,  167 . 
1041 bid . , 9101. lOSlbid. , 9862-9863. 
hates the whol e Republ ican party and the tariff . He has dug 
out information about the tariff til l  his shoul ders stoop 
under it and his conscience writhes and rises under it. A 
gentle-spirited, relentl ess, and remorsel ess Christian 
crusader . Perfectly inval uable to his fel l ow-Democrats on 
the tariff issue . 106 
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As the years progressed, the McNary-Haugen Bill continued to be 
presented before Congress . Both in 1927 and in 1928, the bil l  was passed 
by both houses of Congress10 7 onl y to be vetoed by President Cool idge as 
"economicall y u�sound. " l O S  On February 15, 1927, while speaking before 
the House, Hul l  decl ared that he had "never given any bil l  any more 
earnest and sympathetic study" than the proposed McNary-Haugen Bil l . In 
opposition to the proposed measure, Hul l  argued that the bill was a con­
tinuation of the Fordney-McCumber high tariff, and that eight-five per 
cent of the American people gained no benefits from tariff protection, 
b 1 . ' d b h . ff 109 ut were on y inJure y t e tari . 
Hul l , in addition to arguments presented in previous sessions of 
Congress, questioned the constitutional ity of the McNary-Haugen Bill . He 
pointed out that al l  l aws and judicial decisions to that date had held 
that a tax shoul d be levied by the federal government for a "general pub­
lic purpose" and returned to the treasury with other tax revenue . He 
stated that the equalization fee, 110  as proposed, would be l evied onl y 
on the farmers producing the enumerated commodities in the pending bill , 
106wu liam Hard , "Leadership in the House, " The American Review 
of Reviews , LXXIV (August , 1926) , 163. 
l07Freidel , � cit. , 259 . 
lOSHicks, !! al . , � - cit . , 480 . 
l 09cong . !!£ · , 69 Cong . ,  2 sess. , 3895. 
110see footnote 92 for a description of the term, equalization . 
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and in . turn would be applied to the entire losses of the surpluses sold 
abroad. Thus , Hull doubted the constitutionality of both the levying 
and the disbursement of the proposed equalization tax.111 
Hull, too, felt that when acceptable prices were guaranteed a 
producer, as the McNary-Haugen Bill proposed, invariably production in-
creases would follow, thereby creating added surpluses . Although the 
section seeking to force compulsory cooperation among the farmers allowed 
for their consent through voting in state convention, Hull opposed the 
measure. He believed that America was not "ripe" for compulsion, and 
referred to the section as "absurd and unworkable." He also regarded 
the bill as impractical in view of its "technicalities, comple xities, 
and artificialness." 
During the same speech, Hull presented an outline of this House 
1 . 11 · f . 1 1 ·  f 112 Reso ution ca ing or agricu ture re ie . He had formally intro-
duced the House Resolution on January 13, 192 7 , 113 which stated that 
legislative measure and economic policies" should be enacted for the 
"relief and recognition of agriculture." The points of the resolution 
were as follows :  
1. Tariff reduction, thereby materially diminishing the 
farmer 's cost of production , transportation, and his cost of 
living. 
2. International trade agreements , eliminating by mutual 
consent the harsher forms of discrimination in trade or com­
merce, and the development of more liberal trade relations 
with broader and better foreign markets. 
111cong. �- , 69 Cong., 2 sess., 3895-3896. 
112I bid., 3896. 113!bid., 1633. 
3. Financial and other aid and encouragement of efficiency 
in agriculture and in the wider expansion and deve lopment of 
cooperative organizations in each branch of the agricultural 
industry for the purposes of transport�tion and marketing, and 
also production to the extent practicable and desirable. 
4. Continued exemption from antitrust laws of farm coopera­
tive organizations or associations . 
5 .  Any additional and more desirable short-term and other 
credit facilities, actually needed and justified by good business 
principles. 
6. Reduction and readjustment of railway rates, especially 
as to agricultural products. 
7 .  Abolition by the States of State taxes on farm lands, with 
the possible retention of a small rate for schools, · 1eaving the 
same state tax to counties and villages. 
8. Systematic suppression of monopolies in the distribution 
of farm products. 
9. Speedy enactment for temporary relief purposes of H. R. 
1565 5,  the Aswell bill, or H. R .  15963, the Crisp bill, 114 with 
certain amendments, for the purchase and orderly marketing of the 
surplus of the principal basic agricultural commodi ties, . and the 
stabilization of prices on a reasonable basis. 
10. The greater utilization of the Mississippi and other 
important water courses for the transportation of farm products, 
and the fullest utilization of water power on farms and for farm 
purposes. 115 
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During this period Hull became widely known as a possible pres i­
dential candidate. The consideration of Hull as a prospective candidate 
began following his election as chairman of the Democratic National Com­
mittee. I n  this high position, he was able to capture national atten­
tion. He was known by many , regardless of their political identity, as 
114Both bills south to establish a federal farm board to assist 
agriculture in an effective and systematic distribution of surplus com­
modities. I bid. , Index, 319, 323. 
1151 bid. , 3896. 
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a sound financial legislator, and for this reason he became a formidable 
presidential candidate. Early in 1923 he was mentioned as presidential 
timbre by his home state , but he requested the Tennessee legislature not 
d h . f h .d 116 to en orse im or t e presi ency. The national convention met in 
the summer of 1924, and during . the deadlock between William G .  McAdoo 
and Alfred E. Smith, there was talk of Hull as a compromise candidate . 1 17 
He was informed by Austin Peay, Governor of Tennessee, that the "in­
siders" were in conference to determine which of two candidate to nomi­
nate--Hull or John W .  Davis . 118 Davis was nominated. 
As the 1928 convention approached, Hull, in September, 1927, was 
again boomed for the presidency by his home state, and he passively 
accepted the endorsement. Tennessee was fearful that if Smith, a Cath­
olic and "wet, " received the nomination, the state would go Republican. 
On the other hand, Hull was both a Protestant and "dry . 1 1 119 The American 
Review of Reviews, in March, 1928, published that Southerners were not 
ready to concede that Smith ' s  nomination was a.ssured. The article men­
tioned that Senators Walter George and Carter Glass and Congressman 
Cordell Hull held many votes. 120 Later, based on the same reasoning , he 
received support from the North Carolina delegation headed by Senator 
116New York Times, March 17, 1923. 
117I bid., July 6, 1924. 
118Hull, ££ ·  cit. , I, 122. 
119New � Times, September 12, 1927. 
120Albert Shaw, "Southern Preferences, " The American Review of 
Reviews, LXVII (March, 1928), 238 . 
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Furnifold M. Simmons . Hull , too, revealed his presidential campaign 
expenses before the Senate Investigating Committee . Before the Com­
mittee, Hull told that he had spent one thousand dollars personally, but 
d b . b d b . . b . 121 expecte to e reim urse y private contri utions . 
As the Smith candidacy appeared assured , in April , 1928 , Hull was 
mentioned as a possible vice-presidential candidate . Many Democratic 
leaders held that he would have a substantial influence in border states--
Tennessee, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Missouri--which would likely go Re­
publican . if Smith were nominated .  On May 23, Hull publicly rejected the 
idea of accepting second place on the ticket.  Soon thereafter, the � 
York Times stated that since Smith and a large element of the Democratic 
Party were sympathetic to a protective tariff, doubt was cast that the 
Tennesseean would make an acceptable running mate . 122 
At the convention held in Houston, Texas , Hull was nominated by 
Harvey H .  Hannah, a railroad executive of Nashville . Hull was described 
by Hannah as the "Andrew Jackson of our time . "  Following the nomination , 
a brief demonstration lasting five minutes took place . Although the 
first roll call was overwhelmingly in favor of Smith, Hull captured dele­
gate majorities from Al abama , North Carolina ,  Tenness ee, and Virginia. 
His fifty votes placed him fourth on the lis t ,  preceded by Senator George 
123 of Georgia and Senator Reed of Missouri. 
121New York Times , May 28, 1928 ; May 8, 1928. 
122,!lli . , April 13 , 1928 ; May 23 , 1928 ; June 2 ,  1928. 
12 3.!lli · , June 29 , 1928. 
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The Democratic Party , as anticipated ,  under the leadership of 
Smith and the influence of Massachusetts and New Jersey, favored a pro­
tective tarif f as part of its 1928  platfonn. Resisting this movement 
with no avail , were Hull and Carter Glass. Glass · related :  "I am· dis­
posed to agree with Hull that, if the Democratic party is to embrace 
Republican doctrines ,  and pe rmit certain Republican states to nominate 
its candidate , it had as well disband and go over to the enemy.' 1124 
During the campaign, Hull, along with other Southerners, pl ayed 
an inactive role in the national election . Smith had made prohibition 
repeal the major issue , and Southern Democratic . members of congress 
wisely chose not to identify themselves closely with the "wet" candi­
date. They concentrated on their own reelections. Their judgment 
proved correct , as most of the Democratic Southerners , including Hull , 
were returned to Washington. At the same time, Tennessee, in addition 
to six other states of the South, went Republican in reaction to Smith's 
"wetness and other characteristics.1 1 125 
On December 31 , 192 8 ,  Hull came in open conflict with Smith and 
the chairman of the Democratic National Committee , John J. Raskob , on 
their views on the tariff issue. Smith felt the party was on record 
for a tariff which would "protect legitimate business . "  The New York 
Times described Hull as the leader of the low tariff faction opposed 
to the S mith-Raskob group . Hull believed that "protection should be 
124Rixley Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass, A Biography 
(New York : Longmans , Green , and Co., 1939 ) ,  2 82.  
125Hinton, op. cit., 185 . 
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given where it was economically vital and that adjustments should be made 
in the most careful, gradual, and scientific manner.1 1 126 
Hull addressed the House on January 3, 1929, concerning the Ameri­
can tariff and the nation's trade policies. He blamed the United States 
tariff policy for the unfortunate creation of a network of high tariffs 
and other trade barriers in Europe following the war. He declared its 
results had been less  production, inefficient use of cap ital, uneconomic 
location of industries, detrimental trade controvers ies, and disastrous 
handicaps to the reestablishment of international trade. He, too, in­
s isted that the United States should have formed in 1921 an "impartial 
and fact-finding" tariff committee free from the "bias and factionalism" 
f 'd . 1 . d . ff · · 127 o pres i entia appointe tari commiss ions. 
Hull opposed passage of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, which was reluc­
tantly s igned by Pres ident Hoover on June 17, 1930.
128 
The Pres ident, 
following his inauguration and having taken notice of the American 
farmers' frightful conditions, had asked Congress in April of 1929 to 
. h . 1 1 . ff 129 C . d b raise t e agricu tura tari . ongress, ass iste y encouragement 
from manufacturers '  interests and "lobbyists representing every con­
ceivable economic group, " prepared a substantially higher tariff bill.130 
126 New � !.!!!!!! , December 31, 1928. 
127
!lli · , 70 Cong . ,  2 sees . , 1072- 1073. 
128Hicks, � !!· , �· ill· , 540. The bil l  was not what Hoover 
wished , but neither did he accept the advice from one thousand American 
economists in the form of a petition urging a pres idential veto . I bid . 
1 29Freidel, � · .£!! · ,  282-283 . 
130carman, � al. , � ·  cit., 480-481. 
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In  its final form, the Hawl ey-Smoot Tariff containe d 75  increases on 
farm products and 92 5 on manufactured goods. The newly e nacted tariff 
raised the average ad valorem duty from the 26 per cent under the Ford­
ney-McCumber Act to an al l-time high of 50 per cent.131 The general 
level of protection was increased approximate ly  7 per cent. During the 
passage of the bil l ,  protests were registered by over one thousand 
American economists and by trade associations in most of the European 
countries. 132 
Shortl y before the introduction of the Hawl ey-Smoot Bil l , Hul l , 
in a statement printed in the Congressional Record, cal l ed attention. to 
the efforts of the Republican Party to enact an upward revision of the 
tariff. He cl everl y declared: 
When I was a boy we were never able to take the same victim 
on a sniping expedition more than once. The Republicans have 
been able to carry many of the political leaders of American 
agriculture on a tariff sniping expedition, first in 192 1, 
second in 1922,  and now they would try it a third time , in face 
of the fact that ninety per cent of our farm acreage produces 
surpl uses, the price of which abroad fixes home prices, and so 
little or no tariff benefits are afforded. 133 
Representative Willis C .  Hawley of Oregon, Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee , on May 7,  1929, introduced the original tariff 
bill, which lay within the limitations outlined by President Hoover. The 
original bill was a basis for Republican, along with Democrat advocates 
of tariff protection, to attach additional protective measures.134 On 
131Freide l,  op. cit., 2 83-284. 
132Hicks, et al., op . cit . , 539-540. 
1331 bid., 51-52 .  
134liicks, et al . '  op. cit., 539. 
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May 11 Hull submitted a minority report signed only by himself, due to 
the diversity of thought within his own party . 135 The minority report 
was typical of Hull's tariff speeches before Congress. The New York 
Times labeled the report a rebuttal to Smith's belief that the tariff 
issue could be taken out of politics. Hull contended that the tariff 
should never be dropped from politics as long as there was a "continuous 
and corrupt political partnership between tariff beneficiaries and domi­
nant Republican leadership. " The report, too, dated only five months 
before the great crash in September, 19 29, stated that America's pro­
ductive capacity was 25 per cent greater than her ability to consume. 
Thus, Hull observed that the solution of unemployment was the develop-
£ f . k 136 ment o oreign mar ets. 
The following day , Hull delivered on the floor of the House of 
Representatives an address , which was the "most exhaustive tariff speech 
137 of his career. " The speech covered nearly twelve pages in the Con-
gressional Record. 138 The veteran Congressman directed a steady stream 
of charges, backed with abundance of statistical information, upon 
those who supported protection. He criticized the high rates of Ameri­
can tariff system as compared to those of other countries. He observed 
135Hull, £f ·  £it., I ,  132- 133 . 
136
New !2!! Times, May 12 , 1929 . 
1371 bid. 
138cong. g.!.£ . ,  7 1  Cong. , 1 sess. , 1201- 1212 . 
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that our nation ' s  tariff rates were topped by only one other country, 
Spain . Hull noted that the United States took the lead in upward tariff 
revision in . 192 2 and carried most of the other countries along with it 
in forming "extraordinary high-tariff structures . 11 139 
Continuing in the same speech, and in reference to the inequa l ity 
between agriculture and industry, Hull described the splendid historical 
role played by those of rural background. He declared: 
When I recall that the highest and the finest types of our 
civilization in all the centuries past originated among rural 
people, t�at the cities have never been able to preserve and 
maintain those high types in a permanent way, but they . have 
always found their last retreat back among that sturdy yeomanry 
that reside in the rural sections--when I contemplate this situ­
ation I naturally fall in with Thomas Jefferson's ideas that we 
should so conduct our national policies as to maintain an equi­
librium between agriculture and industry in this country 
[applause] ; that we should not allow one to submerge the other ; 
that we should keep them on a balance just as we keep our three 
departments of government on a balance ; that this more nearly 
· than all other polic ies is calculated to guarantee the permanency 
of a free republic . [App la use :J 140 
As Hull continued to speak before Congress on the princ iples in 
which he believed so strongly, he also continued to reach only closed 
ears. In his Memoirs he reviewed that disquieting period: 
The year 1929 was perhaps the nadir of my Congressional 
career. We had lost the national elections ; I was disturbed 
by those Democrats who had swung toward high-tariff ideas ;  my 
fight of two decades to reduce tariffs was failing to keep 
them at their existing level, because a new movement to boost 
them still higher was successfully under way in Congress, re­
sulting in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1 9 30 ;  and my health was not 
too good , 1 4 1  
1 39
!lli , ,  1 205 . 
140
!lli
. , 2 sees . , 1203 . 
141 Hull , 2,2 • .£!!· , I ,  132 . 
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Hull, understandably, became depressed and contemplated return­
ing home to Carthage to practice law. 1 42 Then in late August of 1929 
Senator Lawrence D. Tyson of Tennessee died, and Governor Henry H. 
Horton appointed William E .  Brock of Chattanooga to fill the vacancy. 
Brock filled Tyson's seat until November, 1930, when he stood for elec­
tion to the short term, the lame duck Congress beginning in December, 
1930, and lasting until March 4, 1931 . Also, in November, 1930, an 
election was held for the Senate term of the full six years starting 
March 4, 1931 . Therefore, Hull was confronted with the choices of 
running for either the short term, the long term, or both terms � 1 4 3  
Hull was not interested in serving in the lame duck session of 
Congress, but at the same time he was fearful that if Brock were elected 
to the short term, he might likewise succeed as a candidate for the full 
t 1 44 erm. Finally, after careful consideration, and with his doctor ' s  
approval concerning his questionable health,145 on September 2, 1929, 
Hull announced his candidacy for the six-year t,rm beginning March 4, 
1931. In the meantime, Tennessee Democratic supporters of Brock real­
ized that Hul l ' s  candidacy would be too strong for Brock to encounter , 
and favored his running only for the short term session. This action 
was taken even though it was widely held, in accordance with Tennessee's 
strictly observed geographical distribution of senators, that since 
142Hinton, op. cit. , 193. 
1 43Hull, ££· cit. , I ,  134. 
144ainton, ££· cit. , I, 193 . 
145Hull, �- cit. , I, 134. 
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Tyson had been from Knoxville, his successor must also come from East 
Tennessee . Thus, Brock from Chattanooga, the western boundary of the 
eastern part of the state, was considered a logical choice . At that 
time, Senator Kenneth D .  McKellar of Memphis represented the western 
portion of the state . It was believed by many that the election of Hull 
from upper-Middle Tennessee would result in undue weight to the western 
section of the state . 146 
The political machine of the former United States Senator Luke 
Lea was hastily reorganized . Lea, in 1915, due to his attempt to con. 
trol state politics, had been temporarily quieted by Huli . 147 In  
Memphis was the political boss, Ed Crump, who at that time cooperated 
with Lea. The group led by Lea and Crump put up A .  L .  Todd, who was 
Hull's major opposition. Hull based his campaign for the Senate on his 
numerous years of service in the House, and on the support of personal 
friends and "Democrats more interested in the welfare of the Party and 
country than in any faction or individual . "  In addition, he anticipated 
and received strong backing from the "national soldiers, farm, labor, 
and rural carrier and postal organizations . 1 1 148 
The campaign dealt mostly with domestic issues and personal 
accusations. Todd greatly stressed the fact that Hull's automobile 
carried a District of Columbia license rather than a Tennessee one , and 
146Hinton, £2 ·  .£!!· , 194 . 
147see page 29 for discussion of Hull and Lea ' s political fight 
in 1915 . 
148Hull, ,2R •  ill• ,  I ,  135 . 
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that he used a driver from Washington . Hull was quick to secure both a 
Tennessee license and driver. His theme during the campaign was based 
on the subject of democracy. He won in the Democratic primary by a 
"substantial majority, 11149 defeating Todd by 61, 000 votes.150 The New 
York Times, in a complimentary editorial on Hull, stated that his elec­
tion would do much "to raise the Senate level of industry, intelligence , 
and gentility." At the same time, the paper, in a derogatpry reference 
to Senator McKellar, declared it would be praiseworthy of Tennessee to 
"give Mr. Hull an equally high-grade colleague. 11 15 1 In the general 
election of November, 1930, as expected, Hull soundly defeated the Re­
publican candidate, Paul E .  Divine of Johnson City , 152 Hull's majority 
increased to more than 100, 000 votes. 153 
Following the general election, Todd became dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the primary election. He, therefore, demanded and received a 
United States Senate investigation of the expenditures made in that cam­
paign . Todd questioned the legality of certain campaign expenditures 
made by Hull. The investigation was conducted by Senators Gerald P. 
Nye of North Dakota and Robert F. Wagner of New York. Hull presented 
a detailed list of expenditures to the Senate committee, 154 claiming he 
149Knoxville News-Sentinel, August 8 ,  1930 , I - 1. 
150 Hull, £2 • ill• , I, 138 . 
151Hinton, £2 · cit . , 195 . 
152Knoxville News-Sentinel , November 5, 1930 , I - 1. 
15 3Hu 11 , _2E • cit • , I , 13 9 • 
1541 bid. 
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155 had spent $ 10, 000 ; whereas, Todd refused either to testify or to sub-
mit a report . The committee ruled in favor of Huli. 156 
As a Senator-elect, Hull rarely spoke on the floor of the House 
during the remaining session of his elected term to the Seventy-first 
15 7 Congress . Nevertheless , Hull's views on the prevailing depression 
and the tariff issue were presented before Congress. On February 16, 
1931, a statement by Hull entitled "Economic Policies of the Government" 
. . C . 1 d 158 was inserted in the ongressiona Recor . 
"Economic problems, including tariff and commercial policy," Hull 
declared, "·would come first on any Democratic National Party program 
during the next two years."159 He condemned the Republican Party, under 
the influence of strong business forces, for once again allowing the 
nation's economy to reach panic conditions. He observed that immediately 
after the close of the recent war, the United States raised its protec­
tive tariff walls, and in due course other nations throughout the world 
followed suit. Therefore, Hull felt that the increased tariff barriers 
had predominantly caused the "present world economic collapse. 11 160 He 
also noted the very slight increase of world trade of 1929  over 1913 for 
both exports of the United States and other nations of the world . Hull 
155Hinton, � ·  cit., 194 . 
156Hull, � ·  cit., I ,  139 . 
15 7cong . �- , 71 Cong., 3 sess., Index, 150. 
1581 bid . , 5045. 
l60i bid . 
159I bid . 
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then pointed out the substantial prewar amount of increase the United 
S h d 11 . d d . D . d . ·  . . 161 tates a annua y experience uring a emocratic a ministration. 
Thus Hull completed his career in the House of Representatives 
with the tariff issue very much alive. During the twenties, he strength­
ened his views concerning economic cooperation with other countries by 
his support of a conference of nations to be called by the United States. 
He again proved his financial leadership by his actions as a dedicated 
dissenter from Republican fiscal policies, and became associated in the 
upper circles of the Democratic party as its chairman and contender for 
the presidency. Most important, he was one of the nation's most formid­
able opponents of the protective tariff. The Senator-elect was prepared 
for combat in the upper house . 
1 61I bid . 
CHA.PIER V 
SENATORIAL CAREER 
On December 7, 1931, Cordel l  Hul l  was administered the oath of 
office as a newly elected United States Senator.1 A week later he was 
chosen to serve on the Senate Banking and Currency and the Finance com­
mittees . 2 His tenure in the Senate lasted only the duration of the 
Seventy-second Congress, for in January, 1933, he was asked by President­
elect Roosevelt to become Se.cretary of State. During his short period of 
service in the Senate he continued to advance the same outspoken views 
on the government ' s  fiscal po licies that he had repeatedly presented in · 
the House, including his advocacy of a lower tariff. As he had done 
during his last years as a representative, he gave his opinions freely 
as to what shoul d be done to combat the economic depression . These views 
were not always in accord with those advanced by President Hoover . 
The President believed the depression was world-wide and that it 
was de laying America ' s  recovery. Thus, in June, 1921, he advocated a 
moratorium on intergovernmental debts . However, the proposal, which 
was accepted by fifteen governments, was too late, as the German and 
Austrian economies had failed .  Thus, the United States soon felt the 
effects of the European disaster and saw that more urgent legislation 
1 Cong . � . ,  7 2  Cong . ,  1 sess . ,  5. 
2I bid . ,  439-440 . 
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was required. In January, 1932, . the Reconstruction F inance Corporation 
was formed and provided with $ 2,000,000,000 to lend to banks, railroads, 
and mortgage companies near bankruptcy. The Federal Land Banks were 
created and allowed $ 12 5,000,000 to maintain farm mortgages. The income 
tax was raised. To prevent foreclosure of individually owned homes, the 
3 Federal Home Loan Bank Act was passed in July, 1932. During the Hoover 
Administration, over $ 2,225,000, 000 was spent for public works.4 Con­
cerning specific bills which were enacted, Hull voted for the establish­
ment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Land Bank 
Act, but failed to vote on the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. 
Senator Hull, on January 15, 1932, advocated a thoroughgoing re­
vision of the nation ' s  tax structure. He contended there had been ex­
cessive increases of taxes--federal, state, and local--from $ 7,500,000,000 
in 192 2 to $9,700,000,000 in 1929, and there was urgent need for reforms 
in all government operations. He declared : 
We see today a thoroughly confused, demoralized, and chaotic 
tax situation, with most systems distinguished by discrimination, 
excessive exemptions, exceptions, allowances, unscientific rates, 
double, triplicate and quadruple taxation, and narrow and lop­
sided methods, as the rule rather than the exception. 6 
Rather strangely , on one point Hull wholeheartedly agreed with 
Hoover's Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, who stated, ' 'We have 
3 Carman , !! .!.! · , �· .£!! · , 508 . 
4ilicks , !! !!.· , �·  .£!!· , 546 . 
5cong . � - ,  72 Cong. , 1 sess . ,  1705 ; 1879 ; 15604 . 
6
!,lli . ,  2017 . 
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at the present time an internal-revenue system of few and relatively 
light taxes." Hull contended that this system of limited taxation was 
the major drawback in the treasury's futile effort to deal with the ever-
. d f . " t  
7 surmounting e ici . He observed that the treasury of the United States 
was facing an economic crisis virtually comparable to the seriousness of 
wartime conditions. Therefore, he was of the opinion that those capable 
of paying taxes "should cheerfully step forward and assume again, as 
they did in World War I ,  surtax, gift, and estate tax boosts up to 40 per 
cent . "8 
Before the Senate on February 8, 1932, Hull outlined the following 
program of tax cooperation for federal, state, and local governments: 
1 .  Present expenditures--federal, state, and local--of 
$ 12, 000, 000, 000 should, by the most ruthless economies, be 
reduced, during the next two years in an aggregate amount 
running into the billions . 
2 .  Federal, state, and local taxes of $10 , 000 , 000 resting 
as one common burden on the 123, 000, 000 American people should , 
at all hazards, be reformed, made more equitable, and reduced 
20 to 35 per cent as speedily as may be legislatively possible . 
3. Federal, state, and local indebtedness of $32,000 , 000, 000 
was in numerous instances incurred unwisely, unsoundly, and reck­
lessly, with no sinking-fund provisions, subject to excessive 
interest, with the calamitous result that the credit of most 
branches of the government in America is seriously impaired. 
The policy of steady payment of the public indebtedness inaugu­
rated by Thomas Jefferson should be maintained . No government 
can justify chronic borrowing to pay current demand, or tolerate 
with complacency a gaping deficit until it reaches a rate of near 
$3, 000, 000, 000 per annum, while sinking-fund policies are in 
effect suspended . 9 
7I bid . 
9� . ,  351 2 .  
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On May 23, 1932, Hull again called the Senate ' s  attention to his 
desire for coordination of federal, state, and local taxation . The ad­
dress was made . during the dinner hour when many of the senators were not 
in attendance . His position in reference to the deplorable state of 
affairs was that the nation's capital should lead other forms of govern­
ment by becoming the first to overhaul its inefficient means of opera­
tion . He believed that "no living person except a very few expert 
accountants know how to read the balance sheet of the Treasury Depart­
ment, 1 110 which he claimed represented nothing more than mass confusion 
with all its endless types of appropriations "jumbled" together . He 
recalled that his views for many years had been that a system of modern 
accounting in the Treasury Department should be adopted in order that 
any citizen of America, at a quick glance at the balance sheet, could 
readily ascertain both normal and extraordinary expenditures and re-
. 1 1  ce1.pts. 
During the same speech Hull called attention to the amount of 
various properties exempt from federal, state, and local taxation, and 
complained that it was the weal thy who were protected from the payment 
of their fair share of taxes. He noted that $60, 000, 000, 000 of property 
in the United States was tax-free, of which $34, 000, 000, 000 were tax­
free federal, state, county , and municipal bonds. On the other hand, 
he stated that during a Democratic administration and Congress, in 1918, 
$12, 000, 000, 000 of long-term bonds of the federal government were and 
10I bid. , 10940. 
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continued to be subjected to the surtax as enacted in that year . While 
observing that a small number of Americans own the greater part of the 
$ 60, 000, 000, 000 of tax-free wealth, he declared that he would "consist­
ently oppose" any legislation that would allow the wealthy to avoid tax­
ation. He denied that he was "a baiter of wealth, " for he only believed 
that each class of citizenry should pay its fair portion of the tax 
burden. He could not condone, especially in the state of emergency, a 
limited number owning the majority of the wealth of the nation free from 
taxation, and asking that the rest of the country "defend and protect 
it. " 12 
Continuing, Hull condemned the Republic administration for its 
handling of fiscal policies since 1929. He indicated that the Treasury 
allowed hundreds of millions of dollars of possible tax revenue to be 
lost from the exceptionally high profits of 1929. "Instead, " Hull 
pointed out, " just the opposite course was pursued . "  A resolution was 
passed by Congress lowering rather than raising taxes . The objective, 
Hull noted, was to alleviate the panic condition by reducing the income 
taxes $ 160, 000 , 000, but the panic picked up momentum, becoming more 
alarming by the day, and the treasury continued to be drained, and still 
that department appeared not to comprehend the seriousness of the �urrent 
or future extent of the economic crisis. The result was a deficit of 
$206 , 000, 000 for the fiscal year 1931 ; and instead of a surplus of 
$30 , 000 , 000, as predicted by the Treasury Department for 1933 , the latest 
12I bid . 
available estimates showed a deficit ranging from $2, 750, 000, 000 to 
13 $3, 000, 000, 000 . 
1 1 1  
Regarding the tariff issue, on January 4, 1932, only a few weeks 
after Hull became a senator, the New York Times gave added weight to 
Hull's tariff position. The highly regarded newspaper, in an editorial, 
backed Hull's continuous pleas for a world economic conference dedicated 
to the gradual adjustment of existing tariffs. The editorial stated 
that most of the world had intentionally armed itself to obstruct inter­
national trade when trade was most needed. In view of the fact that the 
world-wide depression was in its third year, even an "unsuccessful con­
ference on tariff" would be beneficial . Such a conference would at least 
inform people throughout the world as to the "full extent of the impedi­
ments that have been placed in the way of international recovery by the 
shortsighted policy of nations intent on 'protecting' their own in­
terest . " 14 
On February 8, 1932, Hull took up the attack in the Senate on the 
tariff issue from where he had closed his remarks in the House. The 
address, typical of his later tariff speeches given in the House, was 
largely an outline of the development of the tariff structure since 1920, 
with his customary indictment of the political party which he believed 
most responsible for its enactment. He insisted that the self-seeking 
and excessive policy of economic nationalism which had characterized the 
131 bid . , 10938-10939. 
14New � Times, January 4 ,  1932 . 
. , 
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world since 1920 was largely due to America ' s  leadership in the direc-
. f d . ff . . 15 tive o upwar tari revis ion . Hull noted that following the enact-
ment of the Hawley-Smoot Act of June, 1930, which called for 890 in­
creases as opposed to only 235 decreases, a total of 25 countries raised 
. . f 16 their tarif rates. He bluntly labeled their policy of protective 
tariff barriers as the cause of the economically disastrous world condi­
tions and the "gravest danger to world peace today.11 17 Attacking the 
Hoover administration , he denounced it for not having plans or programs 
for the solution of the countless  and seemingly enduring economic diffi­
culties . 18 
Concerning the question of where the panic originated , Hull stated 
that high-tariff minded America claimed that the panic was precipitated 
in Europe , while Europe , with equal intensity , maintained that the panic 
began in the United States. He insisted that it must be acknowledged 
that the United States was the most prominent financial and economic 
power among the nations of the world ; that its financial resources were 
either not permanent or were unstable ; that its policy of nationalism had 
been followed and praised s ince 1 9 30 ;  and that the stock market crash in 
New York had set off a shock wave felt by every organized financial 
trading establishment throughout the world.19 Rull asserted that Old 
Guard Republicans were pinpointing the blame for the panic as far away 
1 5 Cong. !!..£ · , 72 Cong. , 1 see s . ,  3505. 
161 bid. , 3509. 17!,lli . ,  3512. 
18t bid . , 3507 . 19r bid. 
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from the United States as possible . From the numerous contradictory 
statements of Republican spokesmen, he said, "one might plausibly con­
clude that the panic originated in the great Arabian desert, or some­
where near the middle of the Indian Ocean, but that in any event the 
Republican administration had nothing remotely to do with it . 1 120 
Continuing, and in reference to England's going off the gold 
standard in September, 1931, 2 1  Hull thought that the United States was 
"incapable of administering the gold standard . " He also insisted that 
the United States could not provide the leadership for an effective and 
suitable distribution of gold and an acceptable plan of monetary stabil­
ization for the various countries of the world. He contended that nations 
hiding behind a protective tariff wall, backed by substantial credits, 
had no right to monopolize the world's supply of gold for their own mer­
cenary needs. Hull, too, believed that the United States was not "quali­
fied by the necessary information , experience, and financial machinery" 
to fulfill the role, recently relinquished by England, as financial and 
commercial center of the world. Interesting, in view of his subsequent 
career, was Hull's conclusion that international cooperation was the 
best possible method of lowering the tariff walls and reestabl ishing a 
sound international credit structure . 22  To promote international coop­
eration for those goals, Hull believed the American government could do 
its part by enacting legislation authorizing the President to call a 
20  � . , 3504 . 
2 1 � · ,  Index , 771 . 
22� . ,  3505 ; 3 673 . 
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world economic conference , allowing the President to negotiate trade 
agreements "based upon mutual tariff concessions and the unconditional 
most-favored nation doctrine, "  and the erection of an "impartial fact­
finding commission" for the cautious downward revision of the existing 
tariff structure. 23 
Following the speech, Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas,. 
Democratic floor leader, declared the address reflected "profound 
thought . "  Senator Robinson believed Hull ' s  speech embodied "sound prin­
ciples of government and should receive general consideration . "24 
The basis of Hull ' s  goal for lowering the tariff structure was 
embodied in a proposed bill calling for passage of an amendment to the 
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930. On March 2 4 ,  1932, before the Senate, 
Hull supported the passage of this bill. Much of the speech was devoted 
to criticism of President Hoover for his reluctance to take decisive 
action in dealing with the deplorable economic conditions. Recalling 
that the panic had begun in October, 1929, Hull observed that the Hoover 
administration was still making use of only temporary emergency relief 
measures and was holding the United States to an outmoded policy of eco-
. . l . . 25 nomic iso ationism. He firmly voiced his opinion that the "mad pur-
suit of economic nationalism or aloofness or seclusion--every nation 
striving to live unto itself--has proved utterly empty and disastrous. 26 
23I bid . ,  351 1. 
25� . ,  6787- 6788 , 
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The bill was passed by both houses of Congress , vetoed by Presi­
dent Hoover , and later the lower house sustained the President's veto.2 7  
President Hoover stated in his veto message that the United States, at 
this time more than ever in its history, needed the benefits of tariff 
protection. If  the purpose of the bill was to reduce tariff rates by 35 
per cent on those imports not on the free list, the President observed, 
then the simple remedy was for Congress to specify only those items need­
ing reduction and enact legislation accordingly . The President opposed 
the part of the bill calling for the withdrawal of presidential authority 
to adopt or reject rate changes recommended by the bipartisan Tariff 
Commission. Hoover felt this elimination would reduce the Tariff Commis­
sion to no more than an advisory group, in that the proposal would re-
strict the commission's ability, subject to the President ' s  approval, to 
change the tariff rates up to 50 per cent . He expressed the effective- · 
ness of the flexible provisions as used by the Tariff Commission in ite 
recommendations to him.28 
The President also found fault with the proposal calling for an 
international conference whose purpose would be the lowering of existing 
tariffs. Hoover declared he did not want to submit what he considered 
a domestic question to an international conference. Concerning the sec­
tion authorizing the President to "negotiate with foreign governments 
2 71 bid., Index , 888. 
281 bid., 10035-10036. 
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reciprocal trade agreements under a policy of mutual tariff concessions," 
Hoover felt this portion of the bill was in direct contradiction to 
other sections seeking "to eliminate discriminating tariffs ; or prevent 
economic wars ; or promote fair, equal, and friendly trade . "  He indi-
. cated that the American government in the past had acted upon a well­
proven policy of like treatment for all nations of the world . President 
Hoover reasoned that the reciprocal arrangements with one country to the 
exclusion of other countries meant the renouncement of the rule of equi­
table treatment. Thus, he concluded that the desertion of fair treat­
ment for all nations would be the "very breeding ground for trade wars."29 
On May 19, 1932, Hull delivered his reply to President Hoover's 
veto message. He stated that the President inferred that the existing 
tariff duties on only 35 per cent of imports, allowed ample imports, and 
that the nation's best protection was the continuance of a duty on at 
least 35 per cent of imported goods . Hull maintained that the 35 per 
cent figure was actually much larger than "meets the eye. " The truth 
was that the United States did import a vast number of raw materials duty 
free, but placed a prohibit ive tariff levy on any commodity "even re­
motely or speculatively competitive . "30 
Hull rebuffed Hoover ' s  desire for the continuance of the exist­
ing relationship between the Tariff Commission and the Chief Executive. 
He strongly believed that since the commission was named by the President 
291 bid . 
301 bid. , 10637. 
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and was also under the direction and control of the President, who was 
sympathetic with those who ga ined from tariff protection, the organiza­
tion should be abolished . Hull asserted that he therefore favored a 
bill abolishing what was in effect a partisan commission and repealing 
the flexible provisions of the law whic� had served to increase rather 
than decrease protection. As a replacement, he advocated the establish­
ment of an impartial fact-finding board and the reinstatement of the 
authority of Congress to legisl ate tariff rates in their entirety . 31 
Continuing, Hull said he was- perplexed to learn that President 
Hoover did not favor an international conference on economic conditions 
or the proposal for reciprocal trade agreements based on mutual ta�iff 
concessions . Concern1ng the international conference, Hull told Con­
gress that three months of extensive preparation had been made in e eek­
ing a satisfactory solution to the intricate domestic and international 
conditions. He stated that those who took part in the preparation and 
approved the international conference represented the most distinguished 
and unbiased economic experts in every important country . 32 As to the 
section for reciproca l commercia l agreements based on mutual tariff con­
cessions , Hull explained that the President, without sufficient know­
ledge , assumed that the bill proposed reciprocal trade treaties "based 
on the conditional instead of the unconditional favored-nation doctrine. 33 
The actual truth , Hull pointed out, was that the bill did not mention the 
31 
O � - , l 638 . 
32I bid. 
33Por a description of "most- favored nation clause , "  see footnotes 
58 and 59 of Chapter III . 
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matter either way . He asserted that Congress, anticipating a contro­
versy, agreed to allow the President to steer his own course of action 
as to whether to negotiate on the conditional or the unconditional 
favored-nation clause. Hull also stated that Congress took for granted, 
based upon the present policy, that the executive department would 
negotiate on the unconditional form of the favored-nation doctrine . 34 
Hull continued his attack on the current tariff law on April 8, 
1932, in an address before the Senate . The upper house was in debate 
over a resolution of Senator David A. Reed, a Republican of Pennsyl­
vania . In view of England having abandoned the gold standard,35 the 
resolution called for an investigation of the "effect of the deprecia­
tion of foreign currency values upon importations of important commodi­
ties into the United States. " Later, the resolution was passed . Hull 
believed Senator Reed' s resolution was a hidden attempt by protection­
ists to once again raise the tariff rate. Both Senators Reed and James 
J .  Davis , also of Pennsylvania, quizzed the Senator from Tennessee, 
asking why both cotton and coal as well as other imports should not be 
curtailed to protect domestic employment . The two senators from Pennsyl­
vania called Hull's attention to the recent increase in competition of 
cotton and coal from abroad. Hull admitted that a number of cotton and 
coal workers were affected by imports, but carefully observed that our 
exports of those two commodities far exceeded our imports. Thus, Hull 
341bid., 10639. 
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reasoned that America's exports of cotton and coal, as well as many other 
goods, provided far more jobs than were comparatively lost due to im­
ports. With the assistance of Senator Edwa�d P. Costigan of Colorado, 
he also argued there was no need to become alarmed and enact higher 
tariff walls because the English nation had gone off the gold standard. 
Hull pointed out that following England's dropping of the gold standard , 
her exports to the United States had gradually lessened.36 
During the same speech Hull also brought to the nation's atten� 
tion the abnormal amount of surpluses of goods being produced by the 
leading countries of the world . He asserted that 20, 000, 000 people 
throughout the world would find their conditions worsened instead of 
lightened if a sound economic policy based largely on a lower tariff 
were not adopted by the great creditor and surplus-producing nations. 
He called upon the United States to do her part to alleviate the situa­
tion. He also presented statistics conc�rning American exports and im­
ports, showi�g the vast decline in world trade of a leading creditor 
and surplus-producing country. Hull noted that in January, 1927, the 
United States exported $419, 000, 000 ; whereas, in January, 1932, the 
figure was $ 150, 000, 000. Concerning imports, he observed that in January, 
1927, the American government received $356, 000, 000 worth of goods from 
abroad ; whereas, in the corresponding month of 1932, the figure stood at 
only $ 136,000, 000 . 37 
36� . ,  7736-7744 . 
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During Cordell Hull' s senatorial career, he became a leading 
backer of Governor Franklin D .  Roosevelt' s bid for the Democratic presi-
d . l . . 38 entia nomination . Significantly, Hull himself was still considered 
by many as a possible presidential candidate . Following Hull' s election 
to the Senate, the Review of Reviews sununarized his qualifications in 
an article on potential presidential candidates. The magazine presented 
the Tennessee Senator as an authority on tariff matters, "an uncompro­
mising foe of high protection, " an advocate of international coopera­
tion, and as a leader of "calm judgment and cautious movement. "  This · 
periodical pointed out also that although bankers and manufacturers might 
oppose the lowering of tariffs and at the same time for personal reasons 
support international cooperation, Hull' s support of such policies was 
based upon his firm belief that they would "safeguard the interest of 
the conunon run of men . " Thus, the Tennesseean' s convictions identified 
him with a large segment of the voting population . 39 He, too, was men­
tioned by Colonel House in a conversation with James A .  Farley, Chair­
man of the New York State Democratic Committee, as his choice for the 
presidency in the event Roosevelt lost the nomination . Colonel House 
also referred to Hull as an "ideal candidate" for Roosevelt's vice­
presidential running mate . 40 I n  his book, Behind the Ballots, Farley 
38James A .  Farley, Behind the Ballots (2 vols. , New York : Har­
court, Bratt and Co. , 1938), I, 101 .  
39Emily Newell Blair, "Opportunity Rouses the Democrats," The 
American Review of Reviews, LXXXII (December, 1930) , 59-61 . 
4°Farley, � - cit . , I ,  100 .  
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described Hull in the following manner :  
I came to know him intimately as a result of my frequent trips 
to Washington during the preconvention period . He was devoted 
and untiring in his labors, and the advice he gave was nearly 
always correct . I conferred with him alone on many occasions, 
and he sat in on a number of general conferences .  I t  has been 
my experience that when men sit up close around the table in 
political discussion, especially when stakes are high, a good 
glimpse of their real character is almost always possible . Am­
bition is pretty heady stuff, and it is frequently difficult for 
an individual to overlook his own personal interests for the sake 
of the cause he is serving . I don't intend that as a general 
criticism , or intimate that I am any diffe rent in that respect 
from other men .  However, in a life devoted to politics, it is 
natural for a man to size up those with whom he is in constant 
contact, and with whom he must deal . I formed the opinion early 
that Cordell Hull was the most unselfish man I had ever met in 
politics, and nothing has happened since to cause me to change 
that opinion. Holding such an opinion, it was easy for me to 
agree with Colonel House that he was capable of filling any posi­
tion of honor, including the Presidency, with distinction. 41 
I n  the fall of 1931, Senator-elect Hull, along with Senators 
Burton K .  Wheeler of Montana and Clarence C. Dill of Washington, became 
the nucleus of Roosevelt ' s  earliest senatorial supporters . 42 Soon , 
Senator Alben W . Barkley of Kentucky was added to the group . Later, 
Barkley, writing in That Reminds Me, referred to Hull as the charter 
member of the small group of senators . 43 
Hull and Roosevelt began their relationship during the Wilson 
Administration when Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Al­
though each person ' s  official position required no direct contact, the 
two became acquainted at various governmental functions . 44 The rela-
41I bid. , 101-102 . 42I bid. , 89. 
43Alben W. Barkley ,  That Reminds Me (Garden City , New York : 
Doubleday and Company , I nc . :-T§43) , 140. 
44Hull , £E· cit. , I ,  94 . 
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tionship of the two Democratic leaders became much closer following 
Hull's differences with the Democratic Party as led by Alfred E .  Smith . 
Even though Hull supported ( but halfheartedly) the Democratic ticket 
in 1928, as has been previously described, he did not support Smith's 
views calling for tariff protection. In April, 1929, as on other occa­
sions, Hull issued a statement aimed at the party's titular spokesman . 
He bitterly condemned those "Democrats who are undertaking to effect 
arrangements for the unconditional surrender of the Democratic Party 
to the forces of high-tariff greed and privilege . "  Thereafter , Hull's 
conferences with Roosevelt increased, as the two found mutual agree­
ment on the tariff issue and economic policies. In his conversations 
with Roosevelt, Hull clearly made it known his opposition to Smith and 
to John J. Raskob, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who 
held similar views. Significantly, due to Roosevelt's continued associ­
ation with Smith , Hull never discussed his plans with Roosevelt for 
challenging the Smith-Raskob faction . 45 
The showdown came in early 1931 in a national committee meeting 
called together by the Smith-Raskob faction. The purpose of the meeting 
was that the national committee might declare publicly the entire party's 
position on various issues, particularly prohibition. Smith and Raskob ' s  
group was determined that the committee adopt .a resolution requesting 
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment as part of the 1932 platfom. Hull 
strongly objected to a few men expressing the views of all members of 
451 bid. , 130-132 , 141. 
1 2 3  
the party . On  March 2 ,  1931, the New York Times reported that his oppo­
sition to repeal of prohibition was "conclusive assertion" of the same 
view expressed by other Southern Democrats . Concerning the national 
committee's views on prevailing issues, the paper stated that Hull "re­
inforced opinions" stated by Senators Robinson, Glass , and Cameron 
Morrison of North Carolina.46 
Three days before the meeting, three national committee members-� 
Hull, Governor Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, and Senator John S. Cohen of 
Georgia--and two senators--Robinson and Claude A. Swanson of Virginia-­
met together and planned the opposition's defense . 47 The group felt it 
would be most detrimental to the party to allow prohibition to carry 
more weight as an issue than the economic situation.48 Hull was especi­
ally fearful that the party would be once again committed to a high 
tariff. Concerning prohibition, he believed the question should be de­
termined by each state acting separately, and that it should not be made 
a "national partisan issue . 1 149 The following night the Tennessee Sena­
tor received a telephone call from Governor Roosevelt saying that he 
was sending two national committee members from New York and his personal 
representative, James F .  Farley, to assist the group opposed to Smith 
and Raskob. Hull was delighted, and knew then that undoubtedly "a 
46New � � ' March 2 ,  1931. 
47Hull, �· cit. , I ,  94. 
48Farley, �· cit . ,  I ,  75. 
49Hull , �· cit . ,  I ,  140-141 . 
complete separation between the Smith and Roosevelt forces had 
occurred . "SO Farley related in his book that it was the first time 
Smith and Roosevelt had been "arrayed on opposite sides of the same 
question.1 1 5 1  
1 24 
The meeting was held on March 5, 1931, and ended, much to Hull 's 
satisfaction, by denying the national committee the right to establish 
the party's position on i�sues, and by taking no action on a higher 
tariff or on the prohibition question . 52 Both groups presented their 
positions on the prohibition question, but Chairman Raskob realized 
that the opposition had a majority of votes to reject the proposal, and 
failed to call for a vote . 53 The significance of the meeting was that 
those opposed to prohibition or those who did not desire to make the 
question a party issue "looked with favor or much less disfavor on 
Governor Roosevelt." Other possible Democratic presidential candidates 
opposed to the group led by Smith and Raskob also received increased sup­
port . I n  addition, Smith's influence in his own state of New York, as 
a former governor, was greatl y weakened in the national committee .  
According to Hul l,  the meeting represented "the most important turning 
point which ultimately resulted in the defeat of Smith and the nomination 
of Franklin D .  Roosevelt for President . 1154 
so�. , 143. 
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On May 10, 1932, less than two months before the Democratic Con­
vention, Hull created a division of thought among Roosevelt's backers 
in the Senate. Tennessee's junior Senator bitterly criticized Senator 
Barkley ' s vote for a duty on coal in the revenue bill before the Senate 
Finance Conunittee. In attacking the Kentucky Senator, Hull referred to 
Barkley ' s vote as "monstrous," and declared that Democratic support of 
a higher tariff was a "legislative and party sin. " Barkley at that time 
was the le ading choice of the Roosevelt group, including Hull, as the 
keynote speaker for the coming convention . The New York Times, while 
describing Hull a.s the "leading Roosevelt champion in the Senate," felt 
it would be most difficult for Barkley at the convention to speak against 
. " ff 55 a protective tar1 . Interestingly, Barkley, as the keynote speaker ,  
strongly condemned the high tariffs successively enacted by the Republi­
can administrations.56 
Three days fol�owing Hull ' s attack on Barkley, the Tennessee Sena­
tor , along with four other Democratic members of the Senate Finance 
Committee, submitted a minority report on the revenue bill . The report 
was in retaliation to those Democratic senators of the same committee 
who had voted for protection. In  addition to Hull, others who signed the 
minority report were Senators Pat Harrison, Walter George, David Walsh, 
and Edward Costigan. The group demanded the elimination of the duties 
on coal , oil , copper , and aluminum . Democrat ic members of the committee 
55� X2!! �' May 11 , 1932 . 
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who did not sign the report were Senators Alben Barkley, Thomas Connally, 
Thomas Gore, and William King. Senators Connally and Gore of Texas and 
Oklahoma, respectively, had voted for oil, and King from Utah had voted 
for copper . The report condemned their action as "log-rolling, " and 
accused the senators of swapping votes with other senators to make cer­
tain that a valuable item. from their section might be included on the 
t t d 1 . t 5 7 pro ec e 1.s . 
Also during the spring of 1932, Hull accepted a request by A. 
Mitchell Palmer, Wilson's Attorney General, to assist in preparing a 
draft for the Democratic national platform . The two worked jointly with 
Daniel C. Roper, former Commissioner of Revenue; Congressmen Henry Rainey 
of Illinois, and William Ayres of Kansas, and other Democrats. As the 
date of the Democratic convention approached, the Tennessee Senator was 
sought by both Roosevelt5 8  a�d those associated with the movement to 
become chairman of the Committee on Platform and Resolutions. On April 
30, 1932, the New York Times published that Hull was not a "receptive 
candidate for chairman." The Senator wished to remain free and "un­
hampered" at the convention so that he might devote himsel f ful ly to the 
framing of the economic sections of the party p latform. Hull maintained, 
too, that by being free, he would be in the best position to "challenge 
the strong influence in the Democratic Party which have been seeking to 
carry it into the Republican right wing on the tariff.1 159 In addition, 
5 7I bid . , May 13, 1932 . 
58.aull, 2-2· cit. , I ,  150- 15 1. 
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Hull explained to Roosevelt that by not having the responsibility of 
chairmanship, he "could defend all provisions of the platform draft 
against attack . 1 1 60 
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Even up to a few days before the convention began, Roosevelt con� 
tinued to expect Hull to accept the position. The Tennessee Senator 
again declined, for the same reason, and recommended former Senator 
Gilber M. Hitchcock of Nebraska . Roosevelt accepted the suggestion, 
and Hitchcock served as the convention ' s  chairman of the Committee on 
Platform and Resolutions. At the convention, Hull constantly defended 
the platform. Although he lost on the prohibition question, for the 
most part the other planks were well accepted by the committee . His 
economic and tariff planks were adopted by the committee and by the con­
vention in their entirety . In his Memoirs, he expressed his gratifica­
tion: 
The convention ' s  adoption of the tariff and economic planks 
delighted my heart. I was gratified to see the Party swing 
back from the Smith-Raskob ideas to a fixed policy of sound 
economics. The way was paved for the trade-agreements legis­
lation in 1 934. 6 1  
The future secretary of state was in wholeherted agreement con­
cerning the foreign policy plank , which stated : 
We advocate a firm foreign policy , including peace with all 
the world and the settlement of international disputes by arbi­
tration ; no interference in the internal affairs of other nations ; 
the sanctity of treaties and the maintenance of good faith and 
good will in financial obligations ; adherence to the World Court 
with appending reservations ; the Pact of Paris abolishing war as 
60Hull , �· cit. , I ,  1 51. 
61I bid . 
an instrument of national pol icy, to be made effective by provi­
s ions for consultation and conference in case of threatened vio­
lations of treaties . 62 
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On the issue of prohibition, Hull lost that battle. Upon his 
arrival to the convention , he attempted to lessen the importance of the 
question by acceptance of its submiss ion to the states for repeal, but 
at the same time not making it part of the party platform . Thus, Hull 
wished to avoid making prohibition a party issue .  He , too, strongly de­
clared that " it would be a damnable outrage, bordering on treason, if 
the convention should not primarily address  itself to the economic condi­
tion of the country . "63 
On the other hand, the wets, led by Smith and backed by the larger 
cities, were equally determined that the party take a stand on prohibi­
tion . The Committee on Resolutions adopted the plank which Hul l  strongly  
opposed . 64 Before the convention ' s  delegate s, in presenting a minority 
plank on prohibition, Hull pleaded for submis sion of the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the states "without making acceptance of repeal a test for 
party loyalty . " The Tennesaee Senator was booed by the wets and followed 
by Smith on the speakers ' platform . Smith, amidst frequent outbursts of 
cheers, excl aimed that there was "nothing the convention can do except 
possibly extend sympathy . "  The convention l aughed, 65 and without doubt 
Hull was very embarras sed .  I n  his Memoirs, he referred to the incident 
62� . , 15 3 . 
63� � !!!!!, , June 2 3, 1932 . 
64Kull , � · .£!! • , I ,  1 52 . 
65 !!! � !.!!!.!,, June 30 , 1932 . 
in the following manner : 
Governor Smith followed me on the speakers' platform, and I 
was not a little surprised to see him engage in both demagogy 
and discourtesy at my expense. Possibly he was stimulated by 
the wild shouts of the packed-to-order galleries.  I had cited 
his position on Prohibition four years before, which was the 
same as I was now presenting. He indulged in a tirade against 
me in order somewhat awkwardly to cloak the fact he had reversed 
himself . No doubt he was also smarting under my four years ' 
constant, active opposition to his organization.66 
Although Smith won that round, he lost the nomination to Roosevelt. 
1 29 
In November, 1932, the American voters overwhelmingly decided 
that the future President and both houses of Congress would be Demo­
cratic. Since the election was a foregone conclusion, Hull played only 
. 1 1 67 a nom1.na ro e. On December 6, 1932, Hull issued a statement to the 
press entitled "Panic Conditions, Problems , and Remedies, " in which he 
promised that the Democratic Party would have a constructive program 
satisfactorily evaluating the postwar economic conditions and that his 
party would provide for extra sess ions of Congress if the public so de­
manded. He repeated what he had often said before, that the "deep­
seated and chronic" conditions, the effect of "blind, selfish, and dumb 
economic leadership in this country since 1 920, " could not be solved 
. d "  1 68 1.mme 1.ate y. 
Senators Costigan and Hull, both members of the Senate Finance 
Committee and personal friends, in January, 1933, worked together on a 
66Hull, � · cit . , I ,  152. 
67Hinton, £2 ·  cit. , 201. 
68 Cong. � . ,  7 2  Cong. , 2 sess. , 65-66. 
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resolution that Costigan introduced before the Senate . The resolution , 
which was passed, called for the Tariff Commission to provide statis­
tical information on imports and exports ·that would be helpful to the in­
coming administration in negotiating trade agreement s . 69 During the same 
month , Hull accompanied the President-elect through the area which was 
soon covered by the Tennessee Valley Authority . While serving in the 
House, Hull, along with other Tennesseeans , had safeguarded the state's 
right to power lying within her political boundary. Upon learning of the 
Norris plan--a project to develop the area on a broad scale--the Tennessee 
group abandoned the ir state-orient ated proposals and gave full support to 
70  the new plan. 
On January 19 or 20, 1933 , the President-elect asked Hull to be­
come his Secretary of State . 71 According .to Hull , "I was really almost 
thunderstruck . "  Thinking a long career remained ahead of him in the 
Senate, the Tennessee Senator insisted he had given no consideration to 
such an appointment .74 Alben Barkley, writing in That Reminds !:!!, men­
tioned that Colonel House claimed the credit for recommending .to Roose­
ve 1 t that Hul l be made the new Secretary of State.73  
Hull requested and received from Roosevelt more time to think over 
the many implications of the position. He clearly saw the vast oppor­
tunities for the cause of international economic peace embodied within 
69Hull , �f · cit . , I, 156 . 
70i bid. 
7 1Hinton , � ·  cit . , 208 .  
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the secretaryship. He also realized he could do more for his objective 
of economic world peace as the head of the State Department rather than 
as a mem�er of the Senate.74 During this period of Hull's thinking , 
Roosevelt became more convinced that the Tennesseean was the ideal per­
son for the appointment . The President-elect reasoned that Hull's 
acceptance would do much to hold Southern support, in view of t.he notice­
able amount of Northern liberal element among his close associates. 
On February 1 7, 1933 , Hull accepted Roosevelt's offer.75 Before 
Hull ' s  acceptance , he impressed upon Roosevelt that he did not regard 
the duties of the State Department as the mere routine of corresponding 
with foreign goverrunents . The Senator insisted that he expected to ad­
vise the President "in every possible way in the formulation and conduct 
of foreign policy . 1 1 76 Four days later , the President-elect officially 
announced Hull's appointment . 77 
In the meantime , before Roosevelt's public announcement, news 
circulated that the appointment had been made. Senator William E .  Borah, 
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations , having been assured by 
colleagues of the appointment , led congressional praise , Borah �escribed 
Hull as an "able , cultured gentleman, a deep student of international 
74Hull, �· cit., I, 156-157. 
75Hinton, £2 ·  cit., 209-210. 
76
Hull, �· cit . , I, 158. 
77Hinton, �· cit., 21 1 .  
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affairs, and a man of courage. " The committee chairman considered Hull 
the "first economist in Congress." 78 Harold Hinton, in his biography 
on Hull, said his acceptance was looked upon with much favor in news-
d. . 1 d bl. ' 79 paper e itoria s an pu ic reaction. 
On the other side, Senator Tom Connally, member and future chair­
man of the Foreign Relations Conunittee, recorded a different impression 
of Hull ' s  appointment. Connally, who differed with Hull on numerous 
occasions while the latter was Secretary of State, later wrote an account 
of the Tennesseean ' s  appointment in his autobiography, � �  is Tom 
Connally. The Texas Senator bluntly stated that Hull lacked training 
in foreign affairs, having never served on the House Conunittee on 
Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations . Senator 
Connally concluded that the appointment was merely a political repay­
ment, as Hull had been one of Roosevelt's staunchest supporters in gain-
. th . . d . . h l · so ing e nomination an winning t e e ection. 
On March 3, 1933, Hull resigned his seat in the Senate8 1  and be­
came Secretary of State the following day. Thus, Hull entered the 
Senate during the dark days of a raging depression and became Secretary 
of State on a day when the nation ' s  economy was at its lowest ebb. 
During this interval , Hull forcibly advanced his views on fiscal measures 
78New York Times, February 19, 1933. 
79Hinton, �· cit . ,  211. 
80connally, �· cit., 201. 
81 Cong. Rec. , 72 Cong. , 2 sees., 5427. 
and the tariff issue. Evidence of his gains was the acceptance by the 
Democratic Convention in 1932 of his economic and tariff planks and the 
nomination of a President who likewise espoused his ideas. 
The career of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State is familiar to 
all students of history. He served in this capacity longer than any 
other American and endured twelve of the world's most crucial years. 
During this years, his strong belief in low tariffs was put into effect 
by the enactment of reciprocal trade agreements with many nations of the 
world. Hull was widely noted for his work in the development of the 
"Good Neighbor" policy of the Roosevelt Administration toward Latin 
America. As World War II  came to an end, he tirelessly worked for a 
future organization dedicated to world peace. When Hull resigned in 
1944 due to ill health, President Roosevelt, reviewing the Secretary ' s  
efforts for "international amity, 1182 dubbed Hull "The Father of the 
United Nations. "83 In 1945, Hull was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize . 84 
On July 23, 1955, Cordell Hull passed �way at Naval Medical 
Center in Bethesda, Maryland . In Geneva, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
interrupted the Big Four Conference to offer the nation ' s  gratitude for 
Hull ' s  "long and fruitful labors in the cause of peace . " 8 5  In Hull ' s 
82� � .!.!!!!, , July 24, 1955 . 
83icnoxville News-Sentinel, July 24, 1955. 
841 bid . 
85!!!! � � ' July 24, 1955. 
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beloved native state, the Nashville Tennesseean expressed the feelings 
of many Americans : 
As much as any citizen of his time he symbolized the rugged 
Americanism upon which our national strength has been built. 
The Jacksonian spirit which sustained him to the end , strides 
on and on across the globe. His words will resound throughout 
the years , his example will sustain and encourage generations 
as yet unborn.86 
86Nashvil le Tennesseean , July 24 , 1 955 . 
CHAPTER VI 
AN EVALUATI ON OF HULL ' S  CONGRESSIONAL CAREER 
Cordel l  Hul l ' s some twenty congressional years , with two of those 
years as chairman of his party , might be analyzed in different segments . 
Each phase represents a maturing and more responsible man . As the 
nation grew in· wealth , population , and prestige , Cordel l  Hul l ' s  stature 
increased as representative, senator , and final ly as secretary of state . 
He was never a person to shirk responsibility , and each added amount of 
responsibil ity led him to new heights of service to his country . 
Early  in 1907, during the initial period of Hul l ' s activity in 
the House , he advocated a lower tariff and the enactment of an income 
tax law as a more effective means of raising revenue . In his maiden 
speech, he pleaded for a lower tariff and an income tax. During the 
early part of the Wilson administration ,  the nation's spotlight was on 
Hul l as author of our first successful income tax law . During the war 
years , the maturing Congressman was invaluable for his fiscal advice to 
Presiden� .W.iJson. Hul l real ized, as the war closed , the need for 
cooperation among the nations of the world , and declared that economic 
wars are but the beginning or "germs" of real wars . 
The period of the twenties , with Republ ican administrations and 
congresses , marked Hul l's time as the dissenter ; nevertheless , he pro­
gressed . Fol lowing his election defeat in 1920, the Democratic National 
Committee stil l thought enough of Hul l to make him its chairman. He 
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received national attention .as the party's spokesman, and constantly  re� 
ceived coverage in the influential � � !.!:!!!• During the twenties, 
he was repeatedly  mentioned as an excel lent presidential candidate not 
only  by his home state, but by many others. He regained his seat in the 
House in 1922  by a substantial margin, and became a leading minority 
member of the House Ways and Means Cotµtnittee during the remainder of 
his service in that body. In the Senate, Hul l was also held in high 
esteem, and was most notable besides his fiscal and tariff positions 
as an ardent supporter of Governor Franklin D .  Roosevelt as the future 
President . 
From this researcher ' s  description throughout the paper and its 
analysis, it would seem that Cordel l  Hul l was a national figure before 
he became secretary of state. This writer is prone to take an opposite 
approach. From the sources read and ·evaluated concerning Hul l,  it is 
my contention that he was never ful l y  known outside of Tennessee until 
he became secretary of state. This conviction is held even in view of 
the fact that Hul l  did receive national news coverage as a tax expert, 
that he was a pres idential cand idate, and that he was chairman of the 
Democratic Party. My be l ief is that the average American did not know 
that he existed until he became secretary of state. For as Americans 
of today are satisfied with identifying themselves with only our very 
highest officials. it is the contention of this thesis that only  a 
relatively few astute fol lowers of the American political scene were 
aware of Hul l. This writer is in agreement with James A. Farley, who 
wrote: 
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While holding definite and well�considered views on public 
questions, Hull never really made himself known to the American 
people while in Congress because of a somewhat retiring disposi­
tion and inc l ination to avoid anything that smacked of "limelight" 
tactics. He never adopted the c ourse, followed by some of his 
colleagues, of sounding off on . any current question just to see 
his name in print, or of issuing a statement merely because it 
was sensational and not because he thought it was true. 1 
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